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This study is concerned on Rio 2016 megaproject management undertaken by the principal 
project actors: The International Olympic Committee (IOC), the Organising Committee of 
the Olympic Games (OCOG) and the Brazilian Government. Firstly, an introduction into 
megaprojects precedes the explanation of two intrinsically linked concepts, Complexity and 
Risk Management. Only after that fundamental portrayal two widely adopted theories in 
Megaproject research will be reviewed, namely Stakeholder theory and Institutional theory. 
In light of the literature and by means of a content analysis to local and international 
newspapers articles, the main project related events that occurred shortly before, during and 
after the Olympic Games were extracted and categorized. In total, twelve project related 
events were identified. The broader project management picture related to those issue is 
supported by a brief description of Rio 2016´s project governance. Finally, the paper 
finishes with the appeal to widen up the academic research on the complexity of the 
Olympic Games as there is a lacking explanatory and evaluative capability of the 
aforementioned theories in assessing the main conceptual undertakings of such a particular 
megaproject. After all, the unexpected issues that the abovementioned actors had to manage 
are best described by four impacting megaproject dimensions: The political impact, the 
aesthetic impact, the economic impact and the technological impact.  
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Este estudo tem como foco a gestão do megaprojeto Rio 2016 realizada pelos principais 
atores do projeto: o Comitê Olímpico Internacional, o Comitê Organizador dos Jogos 
Olímpicos e o Governo Brasileiro. Em primeiro lugar, uma introdução em megaprojectos 
precede a explicação de dois conceitos intrinsecamente ligados, Complexidade e Gestão de 
Risco. Somente após esse retrato fundamental, duas teorias extensamente adotadas na 
pesquisa do megaprojeto serão revistas: Teoria do Stakeholder e Teoria Institucional. 
Segue, em luz da literatura e por meio de uma análise de conteúdo, uma coleta de artigos 
de jornais locais e internacionais sobre os principais eventos relacionados ao projeto, 
ocorridos pouco antes, durante e depois dos Jogos Olímpicos. No total, foram identificados 
doze eventos relacionados ao projeto. O quadro mais amplo de gerenciamento deste projeto 
é apoiado por uma breve descrição da governança do projeto Rio 2016. Por fim, o trabalho 
conclui com o apelo de ampliar a pesquisa académica sobre a complexidade dos Jogos 
Olímpicos, pois há uma falta de capacidade explicativa para uma avaliação dos principais 
empreendimentos conceituais deste megaprojeto. Isto devido ao motivo de os eventos 
gerenciados pelos atores terem acabado por ser explicados por quatro dimensões do 
megaprojeto: O impacto político, o impacto estético, o impacto económico e o impacto 
tecnológico. 
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do Stakeholder; Teoria Institucional;  
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1.  INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH TOPIC 
 
The Olympic Games (commonly referred as The Olympics) are the world’s largest 
international athletic competition held every four years in various locations.  
 According to historical archives, the ancient Olympic Games can be traced back to 776 BC 
until 393 C.E. Exclusive to Greek men and dedicated over a thousand years for the Olympian gods, 
the Olympics rose to such popularity that fighting factions took breaks in order to allow their 
soldiers recover for the competition staged on the ancient fields of Olympia in Greece. Olympic 
medallists were not only greatly admired but also immortalized in poems and statues. However, 
the Games progressively lost popularity with the emergence of gladiatorial combats from the 
Roman Empire and were later abolished by decreed as pagan festivals during the Christian era 
(Olympic Games History, 2017). 
According to the New World Encyclopedia (2016), the foundation of the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1894 is credited to Baron Pierre de Coubertin, who had a particular 
interest in reviving the Olympic Games. At hand, the 79 delegates from nine countries unanimously 
approved his proposal and decided that the first IOC´s Olympic Games would take place two years 
later in Athens. Small by modern standards, that event accounted for 241 athletes from 14 nations 
competing across nine different sports: athletics, cycling, fencing, gymnastics, weightlifting, 
shooting, swimming, tennis, and wrestling. All the competitors were men, and a few of them were 
tourists who stumbled upon the event and were allowed to sign up. Nonetheless, public opinion 
was so ecstatic that Greek officials proposed to monopolize the Olympics in Greece. The IOC 
rejected that request and the next Olympic Games took place four years later in Paris, where women 
made their Olympic debut in tennis and golf. 
Since the revival of the Olympics, they were strongly linked to politics and have been staged 
every fourth year except during World War I and World War II (1916, 1940, 1944). Despite being 
affected by several political disruptions and nationalistic ideologies, the modern Games kept 
growing in all possible dimensions. In stark contrast with the Olympic Games of Antiquity, each 
edition since 1896 became secular, hosted in a different location and open to all athletes from all 
over the world (The Olympic Museum Educational and Cultural Services, 2013). With that in mind, 
the universality of the modern Olympic Games was assured in Stockholm 1912, marked by the first 
ever presence of national delegations from all five continents. Since then, participation took 
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extraordinary levels: More than 200 years later the Summer Olympics returned to Athens, with 
more than 11,000 athletes from 202 competing countries. What was once a one to five day 
competition now enjoys a duration of at least two weeks. In fact, due to the increasing size of both 
Summer and Winter Games, the latter were shifted to a different schedule after 1992.     
In October 2009, Rio de Janeiro was officialised as the hosting city of the XXXI Olympiad. 
The once Brazilian capital was set to stage the first Olympic Games on the continent of South 
America, a continent with a population of 400 million of which 180 million are young people 
(Rio2016 Candidate City, 2009). Determined in leaving an internationally acknowledged legacy, 
Rio 2016 was a project deeply linked to the wider long-term planning strategy of the city. It 
included infrastructure upgrades, new sport venues, the regeneration of the port area as well as 
security and transport improvements.  In favourable economic conditions during 2009, the world’s 
most prestigious sporting event enjoyed full political and financial backing from the three levels of 
the Government of Brazil—Federal, State and City (Rio2016 Candidate City, 2009a).  
Despite the financial crisis of 2008, a relatively robust market economy led to global 
recognition on the growing economic power of the country. Brazil was quickly considered as a 
major developing county, along with other BRIC nations such as Russia, India and China. 
Domestic income levels were increasing through improved living standards, both reflected 
(Rio2016 Candidate City, 2009a) by income per capita raises (15% increase from 1997 to 2007) 
and average GINI Index improvements (0.7 GINI points per year from 2001 to 2007). It seemed 
that Brazil had returned to sustainable economic development with controlled inflation and stable 
exchange rates.  The scope of Rio 2016, which was aligned with the country´s development 
strategies, made it both economically feasible and attractive. Through public-private partnerships, 
the 37 billion dollar heavy project was financed 60% by private capital. Public funds allocated to 
Rio 2016 would benefit from the USD 240 billion Federal Plan for Growth Acceleration (PAC) 
(Rio2016 Candidate City, 2009a). This high social impact programme provides nationwide 
investments in infrastructure, tax breaks and credit facilities. It involves thousands of public 
construction projects around the country such as dams, railways, ports, and roads.  Budgets, with 
contingency levels up to 15% of total expenditures, had been prepared on the economic conditions 
in 2008 considering also planned inflation and foreign currency fluctuations towards 2016 
(Rio2016 Candidate City, 2009a). A detailed post asset plan indicated the post games use, 
ownership and financing of permanent competition venues (Rio2016 Candidate City, 2009b). The 
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sports facilities were located across the city’s four major zones: Barra da Tijuca, Copacabana, 
Maracanã and Deodoro. Most of those venues were already operational, recently developed or 
renovated for the Pan-American Games, According to the Rio de Janeiro´s bid committee, eight 
existing venues required no permanent works, ten demanded reforms, while eight new permanent 
and seven temporary sites would be built (IOC, 2008). Moreover, projects in the area of mobility 
predicted substantial improvements in transportation, reaching then 63% of the population 
compared to the initial 18% (Bach, 2016). This achievement was obtained mainly due to 
construction and expansion of the Metro Line Four, the Bus Rapid Transit System (BRT) and the   
Light Rail Vehicle (LRV or VLT). As an integrated part of Rio de Janeiro´s development plans, all 
of those projects took into account the city’s scenery and the strategic concept of bringing the 
Games to the whole community.   
On a political level all major Brazilian parties including major opposition pledged complete 
support for Rio´s bid, as well as the private sectors of the industry. All guarantees required by the 
IOC were provided through signed letters from the highest authorities including the President of 
Brazil, the Governor of the State of Rio de Janeiro and the Mayor of the City of Rio de Janeiro. 
This support was mainly reflected through several legislative adjustments and concessions made 
in order to host the project. Binding commitments would not be impacted by elections, which take 
place on a four year cycle across all levels of the government. Moreover, opinion polls during the 
bidding phase showed convincing support of the local community about the project: By 2008, 82% 
of respondents in the state of Rio supported the Rio 2016 Bid (Rio2016 Candidate City, 2009).   
 Rio 2016 culminated a decade of several mega events (Table 1). For project teams, all these 
events enabled a great amount of knowledge and technical expertise to be developed. Shortlisted 
as the underdog compared to other higher – profile applicants such as Chicago, Madrid and Tokyo, 
the favourable announcement for Rio de Janeiro´s project came quite surprisingly (BBC, 2008). In 
fact, former bids to host the games of 1956, 2004 and 2012 had been rejected by the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC, 2008). The Olympic bid evaluation expressed particular concerns in 
security & safety, while appraising government support, legal issues and public opinion of the city 
(IOC, 2008).  
In light of all the embracing euphoria placed around the Olympic Games of Rio de Janeiro, 
the main project actors were confident, optimistic and committed to the delivery of this project. 
Nothing seemed to hinder the world’s largest stage of sports, and at the same time one of the most 
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internationally exposed projects set to be realized seven years later. However, the project 
environment of 2016 changed. Unpredictable and obstacles had to be faced by either the IOC, the 
Brazilian government or the local project team. Still, media exposure kept at record breaking levels. 
From the Rio Media Centre (RMC), daily news on the Olympic project were reported by almost 
7.000 accredited journalists from 102 countries (Brasil2016, 2016). The nature of those articles 
were diverse, contemplating sports related news to concrete project management issues. In the light 
of megaproject research and by the gathering of domestic and international journal articles, this 
paper analyses the main project related occurrences during the crucial executional phase of the 
project, the realization of the Olympic Games. Taking into account the existing context of the 
Olympic Games in 2016, how did the main project actors react to the mostly unpredictable events 
reported by the local and international media?   
 
 
Table 1 – Rio de Janeiro´s mega events in the last decade 
World Cup in 2014 
Rio+20 summit in 2012 
CISM Military World Games in 2011 
Pan-American Games in 2007 

















1.1   RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
 This study is concerned on Rio 2016 megaproject management undertaken by the principal 
project actors: The International Olympic Committee (IOC), the Organising Committee of the 
Olympic Games (OCOG) and the Brazilian Government. Firstly, an introduction into megaprojects 
precedes the explanation of two intrinsically linked concepts, Complexity and Risk Management. 
Only after that fundamental portrayal two widely adopted theories in Megaproject research will be 
reviewed, namely Stakeholder theory and Institutional theory. In light of the literature and by 
means of a content analysis to local and international newspapers articles, the main project related 
events that occurred shortly before, during and after the Olympic Games were extracted and 
categorized. The broader project management picture related to those issue is supported by a brief 
description of Rio 2016´s project governance. Finally, the paper finishes with the appeal to widen 
up the academic research on the complexity of the Olympic Games as there is a lacking explanatory 
and evaluative capability of the aforementioned theories in assessing the main conceptual 
undertakings of such a particular megaproject. After all, the unexpected issues that the 
abovementioned actors had to manage are best described by four defining megaproject dimensions. 
More specifically, objectives of this paper address the following aims and questions:  
 
 To introduce the academic literature on megaproject management  
o Review on Megaprojects, Complexity, Risk Management, Stakeholder Theory and Institutional 
Theory  
 
 To depict the project management related issues from the media on Rio 2016 
o Which project related events of the Olympics were highlighted by local and international media from 
May 2016 to November 2016? 
 
 To understand the project governance of the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro 
o Which were the principal project actors of Rio 2016?  
 
 To analyse the principal events occurred during the realization of the Olympic Games 
in light of megaproject theory  
o Which Project Management constructs can better assess the main conceptual undertakings of the 
project execution?  
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1.2  RELEVANCE OF THE TOPIC 
 
1.2.1  Academic significance 
 
 In the field of project management research, the European Group for Organizational Studies 
2017 (EGOS´ 2017) recent call for short papers depicts the actual situation as this: “Projects – like 
other forms of temporary organizations – are characterized by intentionally finite time frames that 
enable firms and other individual or corporate actors to organize in a flexible and ad-hoc manner 
(Sydow, Lindkvist & DeFillippi, 2004; Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008; Kenis, Janowicz-Panjaitan & 
Cambré 2016; Bakker, DeFillippi, Schwab & Sydow, 2016). Despite the increased research by 
organization theorists (Bakker, 2010), (…) progress toward understanding the embeddedness of 
projects into organizational or wider institutional contexts is still limited. Frequently, projects are 
viewed as separate islands with little interaction with their environment. This is still a major 
weakness of current theorizing.”   
 In fact, the intrinsic difficulty of bridging projects to the surrounding environments can be 
explained by the current understanding in the field of study: At all times, megaprojects embrace 
complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty in turbulent environments. The often observable failure to 
deliver complying results in variables such as time, budget or value only indicate that the existing 
project management tools, concepts and techniques are not enough to deal with the complexity of 
today´s reality. On that concern, the practical world of project management seems to outpace its 
theoretical and academic counterpart. Whether referring to project-supported or project based 
organizations (Hobday, 2000; Lundin, Arvidsson, Brady, Eksted, Midler & Sydow; 2015), projects 
are run by formal organizations that need to navigate through complex environments with 
unsatisfactory implements. With that in mind, not only EGOS but also other management 
associations are pleading to open up for new eras of research. The European Academy of 
Management (EURAM 2017) especially welcomes papers that contribute to a better understanding 
on how theoretical knowledge on managing projects can better inform practice. In other words, it 
is said that only “(…) a small number of researchers have looked at more innovative approaches to 
improve the management and governance of these major and mega projects. This topic calls for 
new research approaches to develop knowledge in managing and governing major and mega 
projects (…)”.  
16 
 
 The International Research Network on Organizing by Projects (IRNOP), a community of 
scholars and practitioners with a common passion for projects organizing in temporary 
organisations, even expands the lack of pioneering approaches to all modern project areas. Their 
scope of the announced call for papers “(…) is deliberately drawn widely, to encourage a range of 
submissions covering many topics and themes, including behavioural and process areas, tools and 
techniques and theoretical frameworks. Authors are encouraged to reach beyond usual boundaries 
of the project domain, and to embrace the innovative approaches to defining and developing our 
understanding of the modern project. Hosted by the Metropolitan College, the Modern Projects: 
Mindsets, Toolsets, and Theoretical Frameworks is the selected theme of the IRNOP 2017 
conference that will be held from the 11th to the 14th June 2017.  
 Taken into account the call for papers from the diverse institutions aforementioned, research 
potential on the managing of projects is indisputably high. At the end of the day, academics seek 
answers that range from projects embeddedness on its wider context, to its governing forms and 
finally to the appeal for any sort of fresh thinking that enables a new view for future academic 
application. The scope of this particular paper tries to further fill, even if little, those long-lasting 
gaps in academic research. After all, megaprojects remains even more a promising domain 




1.2.2  Practical significance on the market  
 
 Estimates on global infrastructure spending will be at USD 3.4 trillion per year 2013–2030, 
according to the McKinsey Global Institute (2013). Essentially delivered as large-scale projects in 
developing markets, such investments aim to forestall the GDP growth. The Economist (2008) calls 
it “the biggest investment boom in history.” Understandably, megaproject management enjoyed 
renewed popularity among politicians, practitioners and academics. Hoping to position themselves 
as a strong player in times of globalisation, metropolitan cities of developing countries scale up 
infrastructure through heavy investments that are often only accepted and put on fast track with the 
hosting of international sporting competitions (Kennedy, 2014). Indeed, ‘semi-peripheral’ 
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countries are trying to hold to the pace of globalisation by progressively bidding for major 
international sporting events (Black & Van Der Westhuizen, 2004).  
 Still, Olympics or the FIFA World Cup are just mere examples of the worldwide aspiration 
for bigger projects.  Their extraordinary pace in size, scope and complexity is mounting to 
unprecedented dimensions that seem to be the new standard. While a decade ago professionals 
agreed on the commonly accepted characteristic of megaprojects starting at 1$ billion, actual 
projects aim to multiply this value up to one hundred times. London´s 23$ billion investment 
programme in the expansion of their transportation system, as well as the recently finished 35$ 
billion Port Marvel project for the Rio 2016 Olympics, are becoming almost small considering 
other examples. Scheduled for completion in 2025, Dubai proceeds to build its 64$ billion heavy 
“Dubailand” project: With 278 square kilometres, it consists of theme parks, sports venues, eco-
tourism, health facilities, science attractions, and hotels. It will also have the world's largest hotel 
with 6,500 rooms and a 10 million square foot mall. However, those values are still not at the zenith 
of megaprojects. India is demonstrating its enormous ambitions in infrastructure development 
through the Delhi-Mumbai Trade Corridor (DMIC), a $90 billion scheme to create 1,483 km 
railway track linking nine mega industrial zones from the north of the country to the south. With 
the project completion set for 2017, the cargo along this route is then projected to take 14 hours 
instead of the usual 14 days. Finally, Azerbaijan approved the 100$bn heavy “Khazar Islands” 
construction project, scheduled to be finished between 2020 and 2025. In sum, it consists of a city 
of 41 artificial islands that will spread 3,000 hectares over the Caspian Sea. At the same time, this 
city is expected to own the world’s tallest building, the Azerbaijan Tower. 
 Massive interventions as the ones described before play a pivotal role in the progress of a 
city or even a country. Otherwise unattainable objectives suddenly become achievable through the 
creation of a state of emergency and its consequent pooling of finances, expertise, and public 
awareness. However, reaching such a favourable point is synonym of a project process 
characterized by numerous, diverse and often opposing forces. Those pressures can arise internally 
or externally from local or international stakeholders, and can deeply influence the scope and the 
outcome of the project. Direct actions are required to meet complex, dynamic and often unforeseen 
project obstacles. This process is not facilitated through megaprojects´ large resource 
commitments, long planning horizons and high levels of visibility, both public and within the 
industry. Rio de Janeiro was subject to intense international exposure reflected by the influx of 
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tourists and journalists from all parts of the world. Rio 2016 was the most shared, clicked and 
commented event in history. With such a high level of reporting and public interest, the media 
naturally becomes powerful. Despite acting as an external stakeholder with no formal project 
authority (Aaltonen, 2011; Walker et al., 2008), the media can disturb or even kill the project (Ng 
et al., 2012). Moreover, project managers have to bear the increasing responsibility that lays on 
their shoulders as megaprojects´ capital expenditures are escalating. Lewis & Jens (1987) 
mentioned that “(…) in many cases, the financial health of the owner or contractors is tied directly 
to the successful completion of the project. Even such giants as the oil industry, utility companies 
and their major project contractors have found themselves in financial dire straits as a result of their 
involvement in mega-projects.” Already thirty years ago and in times of “small” megaprojects, 
both authors predicted a rise of complexity within megaprojects but also claimed for a climate of 
complete honesty and integrity between the project team and its stakeholders. Until now, the 
necessity to adapt the behaviour of managers in those domains keeps unchanged. As Flyvberg 
(2014a) stated, large sums of money involved in megaprojects turn out to prosper optimism bias, 
as well as principal-agent problems and rent-seeking behaviours.  
  Conclusively, practical cases on recent megaprojects should be a priority in order to help 
the cognitive limitation of today´s managers in such massive interventions because - then, now and 
in the future – megaprojects will only turn out as a success if we learn to systematically extract 
valuable insights between such types of projects. 
 
 
1.2.3  Personal significance for the author 
 
 Megaprojects and their very nature always attracted my attention due to their long time 
reputation and heritage as potential catalysts for uncontrollable dynamics (Grabher & Thiel, 2015). 
In fact, this captivation lured myself to jobs in big international companies such as Siemens in 2013 
and Volkswagen in 2015. In the first case, I took part in the whopping process of transforming 
already existing diesel to new electrified engines for a Scandinavian city´s entire bus fleet. In times 
of global warming, such a pioneering and innovative plan showed me the importance of 
undertaking projects that are risky but at the same time tremendously satisfying due to their 
significant contribution for the greater good. In the latter occasion, I operated in a project team 
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planning the worldwide launch of the Volkswagen Jetta, a car manufactured in Brazil, India and 
Russia. The aforementioned team acted as the coordinating part between the three plants´ 
functional areas of production, sales & marketing, finance, procurement and research & 
development. I enjoyed the particular challenge of conciliating cross cultural perceptions and 
inputs on one particular megaproject, learning that to work for the same purpose was not a synonym 
for working into the same direction. Thus, not only the technical and logistical challenge of such a 
project fascinated me, but also the necessity for human sensitivity from today´s global managers. 
While both experiences were at the early planning phase of those projects, their unique 
characteristics and unforeseen events already showed up and demanded considerable managerial 
flexibility and determination. 
 Returning to the academic track and determined to finish my master program abroad, I saw 
an opportunity to experience a megaproject close by. This was of particular interest to me because 
Portugal´s minor economy did not enable any recent large-scale commitments. In fact, pending 
megaprojects similar to the construction of a new Lisbon airport or of a new rapid railway line 
connecting Portugal to Spain got suspended. Seamlessly, Rio de Janeiro would not only suit to my 
active outdoor lifestyle, but it would also host the world’s greatest stage of sport. I am convinced 
that living in the city prior, during and after the Olympic Games is a positive, distinctive and crucial 
aspect to take into account when reading this research. With no doubt, it is a motivation for any 
researcher to analyse a project executed in front of his door. As such, I immersed into the project 
environment and experienced the swarm of negative headlines about the corrupt political spectrum, 
the body parts washing up near the start of the triathlon on Copacabana beach, hospital shootouts, 
athletes being robbed and striking police officers. 
  As an appealed reader up to this date, a swift review of past and recent literature across 
evidence one untouched conclusion: Despite the worldwide aspiration for such large scale 
commitments, authors highlight the inherent (and growing) complexity and unpredictability of 
those projects, which often create a sense of managerial frustration and desperation. Rapid 
advancements in technology that should help to predict the outcomes and reduce the risk in 
megaproject undertakings seem not to be enough in today´s context. For that reason, my intention 
with this paper is to contribute to a high potential and still under researched topic. This paper is not 
designed as a new framework or managerial tool, but as a catalyst to spur further research on a 
particular megaproject that to my point of view, is mistakenly neglected by academics.   
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1.3  LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
The exceptional characteristics of megaprojects are not solely based upon the ever growing 
dimensions in terms of scale, scope and cost. More than that, their distinctiveness is established 
trough the contextual elements surrounding its environment and the Olympic Games are most 
likely the best example to describe this singularity. Despite being implemented every four years 
with the same purpose, hosting such a project in a different location is synonym of facing each time 
a completely new project environment. As a consequence, unproven and experienced project 
managers are confronted with the hosting nation´s individualities and dynamics in political, 
economic, social, technological, environmental and legal aspects. In times of globalisation, those 
variables become even more unpredictable as the Olympic Games are starting to take place in 
countries such as Brazil. In the past, events were held in developed countries, either in Europe or 
the United States, which were better positioned to bear the costs due to their larger economies and 
more advanced infrastructure. This observable trend does not mean that prior experience or 
awareness in the management of such a project is invaluable: In "The Fallacy of Beneficial 
Ignorance: A Test of Hirschman's Hiding Hand," by Bent Flyvbjerg (2016), his data collected 
through a systematic testing method rejects Hirschman's proposition that ignorance is good in 
planning projects with considerable levels of uncertainty. Adopted to this case then, managers must 
be able to extract knowledge from any Olympic Games and use it for the next one.  
For the sake of this study, one limitation of this paper is the exclusive focus on the 2016 
Summer Olympics under a specific, yet crucial time frame: 3 months prior and 3 months after the 
staging of the event. Well aware that the preparation phase takes almost seven years, the 6 months 
of analysis are still expected to bring a valid picture on the megaproject. After all, a portrayal of 
the project environment becomes easier when media reporting reaches peak levels that are hardly 
observable during other phases of the project. Nonetheless, the quality of newspaper reporting on 
project related issues associated to Rio 2016 won´t be discussed here.  
Furthermore, this paper has no intention to classify the Olympic Games as positive or 
negative on any basis. Beyond any doubt, such large scale commitments can be evaluated on 
multiple success factors (i.e. applied elements to increase project´s chances to be successful) and 
criteria (i.e. applied measures to evaluate the project at end). However, past literature showed that 
the evolution of project success factors was not synonym to a fruitful outcome (KPMG 
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International, 2008; The Standish Group, 1994). The clear establishment of a common approach 
across different projects becomes therefore impossible. In light of that, the projects´ unique 
circumstances can´t be compared with other Olympic projects and as such the reader should be 
aware about the difficulty to create any sort of comparative analyses  This study will not refer itself 
to any exact variables, performance assessing factors or criteria. Instead, it will ground itself on a 
conceptual definition of megaproject and two widely adopted theories of project management: 
Stakeholder theory and Institutional theory. The selection of those theoretical groundings do not 
mean that other areas of research, such as project governance (that will be shortly mentioned in the 
analysis), are worse or unneglectable in the area of project management. After a cross reading of 
megaproject literature, it was the author´s decision to choose them.    
 At the end of the day, this work should highlight the limited and practical applicability of 
existing theories when assessing an overall picture of this particular type of megaproject, the 
biggest world stage of sport. Major occurrences of the Olympics should be rather classified by an 
adaption of a theoretical concept, and only then analysed event by event with the support of the 
two aforementioned theories. It cannot be emphasized enough that this study depicts a distinctive 
megaproject, in a unique environment under a very specific timeframe. As later demonstrated in 
this study, planning and implementing such a major sport event in a developing country brings 















2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
  
 An introduction into megaprojects is followed by a basic understanding of two deeply 
connected concepts, Complexity and Risk. With those theoretical foundations in mind, largely 




2.1  Megaprojects  
 
 According to Flyvberg (2014), “Megaprojects are large-scale, complex ventures that 
typically cost US$1 billion or more, take many years to develop and build, involve multiple public 
and private stakeholders, are transformational, and impact millions of people”. Such long planning 
and decision making horizons eventually create the distinctive environment of megaprojects, 
analogous to an unique multi - actor interaction between numerous conflicting interests of public 
and private entities. Despite the obvious managerial complications to act in this environment 
(Chan, Scott & Chan, 2004; Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius & Rothengatter, 2003), the need and aspiration 
for more and bigger megaprojects is unquestionable in times of rapid urbanization. Managers now 
require suitable skills, consideration and leadership to handle such an impactful project. Conferring 
Flyvberg (2014), those megaprojects are approached by decision makers through four different 
motivations, to which he calls sublimes: the technological one, defined by the enthusiasm of 
engineers for innovative and record breaking constructions; the political one striven by the desire 
of politicians to build monuments that are at the same time long-lasting and highly visible to the 
public and the media; the economic one characterized by the satisfaction of/for most the 
stakeholders in making lots of money and jobs from megaprojects; and finally the aesthetic one, 
which is nothing more than  the intrinsic pleasure of architects to design iconic buildings.  
 Yet, the author also concludes that average performance is unsatisfactory no matter how 
strong managers follow their aspirations. For example, the technological and aesthetical sublime 
can be pursued up to the point where no learning from past projects is considered helpful due to 
“uniqueness bias”: A common assumption that every megaproject is matchless in all dimensions. 
As a result of that, megaprojects are selected erroneously while costs are underestimated and the 
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benefits are overestimated. They are subject to what he describes as the “break-and-fix” model: An 
often detectable pattern in which megaprojects tend to “break” sooner or later because of 
managerial knowledge/planning gaps in megaproject delivery. In such cases, “fixing” measures in 
form of schedule, cost or benefit adjustments to optimistic or manipulated estimates are 
indispensable. His line of thinking is backed up by other authors, which also state that the lack of 
knowledge on megaprojects results not only in the challenge to coordinate them (Scott, Levitt & 
Orr, 2013), but also in the propensity to be below performance with cost and schedule overruns 
(Thomas & Mengel, 2008; Gilge & Kagan, 2013). Most of the times managed by governments 
(Ika, Diallo & Thuillier, 2012), megaprojects are subject to strict governance frameworks that are 
all scrutinized by several researchers (Christensen, 2011; Crawford & Helm, 2009; Klakegg, 
Williams & Magnussen, 2009; Williams, Klagegg, Magnussen & Glasspool, 2010).  
At the end of the day, the adoption of such frameworks attempt to help project managers to 
cope with the intrinsic complexity and subsequent risk of this particularly large undertakings. 
Those two concepts are unavoidable for any manager because megaproject environments result in 
variables such as budget, time or scope to remain uncertain until the conclusion of the project. 
Variables that are regarded as crucial and more predictable in smaller projects. For that reason, the 
concept of complexity and risk management will be further discussed in the light of the recent steps 
in the academic megaproject domain (Zhang, Wang & Luo, 2009; Williams, 2009; Hu, Chan, Le, 
& Jin, 2015). 
 
 
2.2  Complexity   
 
 A well-established definition of complexity is abstruse (Ramasesh & Browning, 2014; 
Browning, 2014; Qureshi & Kang, 2015; Saunders, Gale & Sherry, 2015), but the basic designation 
of complexity is defined as an entity consisting of many varied interrelated parts and elements such 
as tasks, components, and interdependence. Translating this definition to megaprojects and its 
characteristically long planning horizons and large stakeholder environments (Taylor & Ford, 
2008), megaprojects are complex systems composed of multiple interrelated processes, activities, 
players, resources, and information (Zhu & Mostafavi, 2014). The structure, dynamics and 
interactions of all those elements is what ultimately defines project complexity in all its technical, 
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organisational and environmental domains (Botchkarev & Finnigan, 2015). As so, every project is 
subject to different degrees of complexity (Lu, Luo, Wang, Le & Shi, 2015) that despite all the 
academic efforts to evaluate are still reaching no common ground for evaluation. Debates are still 
figuring out a widely accepted definition of complexity in project context (Bosch-Rekveldt, 
Jongkind, Mooi, Bakker & Verbraeck, 2011; Geraldi, Maylor & Williams, 2011; Vidal, Marle & 
Bocquet, 2011; Ireland, 2013; Brady & Davies, 2014).    
 At the same time, complex projects are often mixed with complicated projects. This long 
lasting misunderstanding is clearly tackled by the authors Bakhshi, Ireland & Zubielqui, (2015): 
According to them, “(…) projects become complicated rather than complex, because the 
management of such is fairly predictable, and essentially linear, in terms of outputs such as cost, 
time and performance. By comparison complex projects consist of ambiguity and uncertainty, 
interdependency, non-linearity, unique local conditions, autonomy, emergent behaviours and 
unfixed boundaries.” Uncertainty under its wide ranging definitions (Williams, 1999; Perminova, 
Gustafsson & Wikström, 2008; McLain, 2009) is therefore recently supported and even 
terminologically confounded with complexity (Atkinson et al., 2006; Geraldi & Adlbrecht, 2007; 
Vidal & Marle 2008; Bosch-Rekveldt et al., 2011; Milind Padalkar, Saji Gopinath, 2016).   
 Reaching a specific goal in complex projects is not similar to reaching milestones of a 
complicated one. Note that small projects can also be complex but the larger of megaprojects´ 
structure, environment and interactions evidences that much more than excellent leadership or 
technical skills are required to reach the targets of cost, time and performance among complexity 
and uncertainty. In fact, statistical evidence shows that such complexity and unplanned events are 
often accounted for leaving erroneous budget and time estimates (Flyvberg, 2014). Those 
unplanned events, or risks, should not shy away managers since they can also come in form of 
opportunities rather than threats (Hertogh & Westerveld, 2010). Therefore, modern megaproject 
planners need to accept risk by admitting that complexity is not going away and will only increase, 
especially when projects are “situated in urban or semi-urban areas and tend to have considerable 
social, environmental, and distributive impacts” (Scott, Levitt & Orr, 2011). 
 This logic of managerial exposition to seemingly boundary less and unpredictable 
environments is what created risk management in megaprojects. Risk will therefore depend on the 
organizational anticipation, comprehension and navigation through complexity: A setting of a 
growing number of interactions within the organizational environment, causing “the inability to 
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predict the behaviour of a system due to large numbers of constituent parts within the system and 
dense relationships among them” (Sheard & Adviser-Mostashari, 2012, p. 11).    
 
 
2.3  Risk 
 
 Overall, project risk is defined as “the effect of uncertainty on the project as a whole” (PMI, 
2013), or as “the exposure of stakeholders to the consequences of variations in outcome” 
(Association for Project Management, 2012). Hence, risk is an event, of positive or negative 
impact, that might occur in the future and that up to the date has not fallen over a project. Becker 
(2004) defined three types of risk: A known risk is one that is clearly recognized in the early 
planning phase of the project. An unknown risk is one known by a very limited group of people 
and not recognized in the project planning activities. Finally, an unknowable risk is a completely 
unforeseeable event until the moment it actually arises.  
 Following that line of thought, project risk management is a systematic process of 
identifying, analysing and responding to all those risks throughout all phases of the project context. 
Several processes are constructed to accomplish that task: According to the fifth edition of the 
PMBOK (2013), project managers should deal with risk in accordance to six steps: Risk 
Management Planning, Risk Identification, Qualitative risk analysis, Quantitative risk analysis, 
Risk response strategy implementation and the final step of Monitoring and Controlling risks. With 
no intention to neglect the importance of such approaches that are all broadly explained, I rather 
shift focus to the principal challenge that megaproject contexts face: In the book Megaproject and 
Risk: An Anatomy of Ambition, the authors (Flyvberg et. al, 2003) state that the biggest challenge 
of risk in megaprojects is not the validity or quality of developed risk frameworks, but the 
inattention of today´s megaproject planners to apply them in a strict manner. Estimates and thus 
risk management are therefore highly influenced by the optimism bias of planners placed for such 
big commitments.  
 The risk of a project is consequently not only composed of known, unknown or unknowable 
risks through the emergence of events in the future, but also of megaproject managers´ ambition 
that leads them to go blindly through the complex environment of megaprojects. Both of these 
factors that contribute to the concept of risk are megaprojects can be tackled by stakeholder theory: 
After all, a clear perception of the surrounding stakeholder environment of a project not only 
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provides all the means to apply risk-frameworks, but also incentives managers to face reality in 
detriment of an overambitious planning.   
  
 
2.4  Stakeholder theory  
 
 The very first conceptual definition of stakeholder theory emerged in 1963 by the Stanford 
Research Institute. At that point, stakeholders were defined as individuals whose existences were 
fundamental for corporate existence. This designation deserved no academic advances until its 
further exploration on Freeman´s renowned book Strategic Management: a Stakeholder Approach 
(1984). In this milestone setting work, stakeholder theory was based on the dynamic bonds between 
organizations and its stakeholders, translated into entities “who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the firm's objectives”. With a quite similar perspective to Freemans´, the Project 
Management Institute (PMI) adopted Stakeholder management (SM) as a best practice knowledge 
area in the PMBOK.  
 Nowadays, a driver for the interest in stakeholder management is the rising struggle that 
governments face in delivering megaprojects (Cuppen, Bosch-Rekveldt, Pikaar & Mehos, 2016). 
Literature attested that SM is critical for project success (Achterkamp & Vos, 2008; Jepsen & 
Eskerod, 2009; Yang, Shen, Ho, Drew & Xue, 2011), but its wide-ranging and fast-growing 
research in the (common) PM area (Achterkamp et al., 2008; Aaltonen, 2011; Eskerod, Huemann 
& Savage, 2015; Heravi, Coffey & Trigunarsyah, 2015; Littau, Jujagiri & Adlbrecht, 2010; Mok, 
Shen & Yang, 2015; Tang & Shen, 2013; Yang, Shen, Ho, Drew & Xue, 2011) didn´t translate 
properly to megaprojects (Jia, Yang, Wang, Hong, & You, 2011). In an environment of mutual 
adjustment to the actions of other parties (Morris, 2013), core capabilities of project based 
companies rely on strategic response shaping to the stakeholder setting (PMI, 2013). It is a decision 
making progress between multiple actors, both public and private, with conflicting interests 
(Aaltonen & Kujala, 2010) and includes “all organizations, and relationships between them, that 
can affect or be affected by the project” (Aaltonen, 2011). 
 To approach SM in a more practical manner, numerous techniques containing interviews, 
forums, focus groups, surveys and workshops were studied and compared (Larson, Measham & 
Williams, 2010). They all contributed to the development of different classification frameworks 
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and conceptual tools in order to identify critical types and attributes of project stakeholders (e.g. 
Achterkamp & Vos, 2008; Bourne & Walker, 2005; Bourne & Walker, 2006; Cova & Salle, 2005; 
Freeman, 1984; Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997; Olander & Landin, 2005; Winch, 2004).  
 Stakeholder identification frameworks are based on pre-set classifications, such as 
external/internal (Aaltonen & Sivonen, 2009), private sector/ public sector/ community/ 
independent (McQueen, Elkadi, Millar & Geoghegan, 2008), and upwards/ downwards/ outwards/ 
sidewards (Bourne, 2005). Internal stakeholders, often referred as primary stakeholders (Cleland, 
1998) or business actors (Cova et al., 2005) are stakeholders that are usually formal, official or 
contractual partners and supporters of the project. They engage in economic transactions with the 
business, such as customers, suppliers, creditors and employees. On the other side, external 
stakeholders, also denoted as secondary (Cleland, 1998) or non - business stakeholders (Cova et 
al., 2005), are informal members but may affect or be affected by the project. They don’t tend to 
participate in direct economic exchange. 
 The foundation for stakeholder attribute assessment is accredited to Mitchell et al.'s (1997) 
notable stakeholder salience model, which had been developed to characterize and classify 
stakeholders by considering three stakeholder attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency. Power 
is described as the strength of the stakeholder to control the resources of the project. Legitimacy is 
defined as the degree of acceptance relative to the stakeholders´ actions in the socio-cultural 
spectrum. Last but not the least, Urgency is set as “the degree to which stakeholder claims call for 
immediate attention” (Mitchell et al., 1997). Bourne (2005) further elaborated on Mitchell´s model 
and proposed a refinement on each of the previously defined attributes. Hence, power is the degree 
to influence the work or the outcomes of the project; proximity is the type of existing associations 
to the work of the project; urgency is the level of commitment to achieve project outcomes. 
Legitimacy got replaced by proximity, as it enabled a more precise interpretation (Yang et al., 
2011). This framework is then concluded through a Stakeholder Circle diagram mapping, where 
the project team weights each of the attributes (Bourne, 2005).  
 Despite all those different perspectives, managers have struggle to fill and go through the 
frameworks. The cause for such difficulty lies on the confrontation of managers with the ever 
increasing complexity and ambiguity of the stakeholder landscape, leading to a pronounced 
uncertainty in the project setting (Burton & Obel, 2003). According to Aaltonen and Kuljala 
(2015), “uncertainty of the stakeholder landscape can be understood as the emergent nature of the 
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stakeholder system, unpredictable interactions between stakeholders and the lack of information 
that managers face with regard to stakeholders' attributes, behaviours and interactions.” He further 
states on the fact that literature makes several references to the tough accessibility of stakeholder 
identification and information (Jepsen & Eskerod, 2009; Mok et al., 2014; Yuan, 2013), 
unpredictability in behavioural and interactional patterns of emerging actors (Aaltonen, 2011) and 
in the uncertainty among stakeholder requests (Tang & Shen, 2013).  
 Calls for research are now targeted on managing those complexities and the dynamics of 
the stakeholder environment. Aaltonen, and Kujala (2015) concluded that “in particular, the 
dimensions of uncertainty, dynamism and institutional context (…) have been largely 
underrepresented in previous accounts of project stakeholder management. As a conclusion, the 
importance of Stakeholder theory in recent times is connected to how organizations respond and 
proceed to institutional complexity when managing their stakeholders. 
 
 
2.5  Institutional theory  
  
In project based organizations, institutional theory addresses the behavioural process of 
social structures over a certain amount of time (Scott, 2012). As an attempt to investigate 
similarities and differences in social settings, it also aims to analyse the relation between structure 
and behaviour. However, institutional theory recognizes institutions not only as social structures, 
but also as concrete independent organizations whose operations are not purely profit-driven 
(Phillips, Lawrence & Hardy, 2000). The model is constituted among three pillars (Scott, 2004): 
regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive elements. The first includes formal rules such as laws 
and contracts (Scott, 2004; Henisz, Levitt & Scott, 2012), which are often imposed externally on a 
company. Normative foundations can be created consciously because they consist of informal 
norms, values, practices and roles. As an instance, internally developed mentoring and training 
standards but also informal relations can lead to routinized methodologies from associations or 
organizations. Lastly, cultural-cognitive elements serve as a basis for social order, and cover shared 
beliefs, symbols and logics of action (Misangyi, Weaver & Elms, 2008; Orr & Scott, 2008; Scott 
2012).  Organizations that identify with a specific occupation or professional network take part of 
this category (Grabher, 2004). 
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In his publication “Managing the institutional context for projects”, Morris (2011) 
essentially acknowledges an evolving stream of project management thought. Following Parsons 
(1951, 1960) work, he proposed that project management could be rationalized in to three distinct 
levels: Level 1 is a primarily technical one, oriented towards an efficient project delivery based on 
operational criteria such as time, budget and scope. Level 2 is a strategic dimension, which looks 
at managing projects as organizational entities. Here, the technical core is isolated from 
environmental turbulence, an aspect that has been criticized afterwards by several authors 
(Engwall, 2003; Söderlund, 2004). Finally, the institutional level is the third and last stream. It 
aims on the development of a suitable institutional context for projects to succeed. This levels 
implicates a broad view on the projects surrounding environment through so-called “hard” and 
“soft” mechanisms. The first encompasses processes and standards, while the latter embraces social 
contracts, behaviours and culture.  
 
 
2.6 Final remarks on the theoretical underpinnings 
 
 The Olympic Games of Rio de Janeiro naturally faced obstacles from different directions. 
After all, the Olympic project included a wide range of different stakeholders, regulators, customers 
and suppliers. The interaction among them is what ultimately set the outcome of the project (Brady 
& Davies, 2010), influenced by the varying perspectives of other organizations or institutions in 
the environment (Dille & Söderlund, 2011). This large interacting environment is a complex 
megaproject system that needs to be managed through an efficient inter- dynamic exchange 
between the elements (Gann & Salter, 2000). Notwithstanding the fact that megaprojects are more 
complex and volatile due to its sheer size (Brady, 2011), the higher probability on the occurrence 
of unexpected issues only highlight the importance of complexity and risk management.  
This study does not look, per se, with greater detail on the interaction of the whole network. 
Instead, it highlights the main issues of the Olympic Games that affected the main project actors. 
With that portraying, future research can be done on stakeholder management and network studies 






3.  METHODOLOGY  
 
3.1 Research method 
 
 The primary data was collected by two qualitative methods. First, a documentary analysis 
was conducted on four newspapers in order to contextualize the project environment of Rio 2016. 
The second method was a semi-structured interview with a person from the local OCOG in order 
to understand how the collected issues related the newspaper articles were managed. Moreover, the 
person clarified on specific points as newspaper articles seemed to provide misunderstanding 
information related to the governance of the Olympic project. 
 
 
3.2  Data Collection 
 
 The following chapter starts with an explanation how content analysis was performed to 
conduct a documentary analysis of newspapers. Then, the major guidelines of the semi-structured 
interviews will be explained in chapter 3.2.2. The following two chapters depict how newspapers 
were selected and how articles were collected for the purpose of this study.     
 
 
3.2.1 Content Analysis – Qualitative, Inductive and Conventional 
  
 Historically speaking, content analysis started to emerge from political investigations on 
hymns, articles, advertisements and speeches during the 19th century (Harwood & Garry, 2003). 
It is a technique of analysing written, verbal or visual communication messages (Cole, 1988) aimed 
to quantify and/or describe a phenomena with valid and replicable inferences (Krippendorff, 1980; 
Downe-Wamboldt, 1992; Sandelowski, 1995). This phenomena should be revealed in a condensed 
yet clear picture, supported by categories or concepts. Academically speaking, content analysis can 
be regarded as a flexible investigation (Cavanagh, 1997) due to its possibility to incorporate from 
an intuitive to a systematic process of examination (Rosengren, 1981). With that in mind, the 
degree of difficulty in applying this method is therefore set by the researcher (Neundorf, 2002).  
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 This particular research method is primarily distinguished as either quantitative or 
qualitative (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) in a deductive or inductive way. Different research 
commitments require different analysis techniques (Knafl & Howard, 1984), so the problem of 
which form to use is determined by the purpose of the study (Weber, 1990). The quantitative 
approach is an objective, obtrusive, generalizable and outcome oriented measurement of a stable 
reality with truths external to and independent of the observer. It follows a deductive path as it is 
an operationalized analysis following academic frameworks intended to test hypothesis or prove 
previously developed theories in empirical research (Kynga¨s & Vanhanen 1999). To ensure the 
legitimacy of the collected data in statistical terms, the selection criteria should be based upon 
random sampling with elected categories demanding to be mutually exclusive and compliant to 
statistical procedures (Weber, 1990). Nevertheless, numbers can be easily manipulated whereas the 
assignment of a particular source to a single category can become a challenge.  
 Qualitative content analysis is “any qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort that 
takes a volume of qualitative material and attempts to identify core consistencies and meanings” 
(Patton, 2002). It is one of numerous research methods used to examine text data observable in 
verbal, print or digital form generally attainable through open-ended survey questions, interviews, 
focus groups, observations, or the print media (Kondracki & Wellman, 2002). In contrast to the 
quantitative approach, the qualitative content analysis “assumes that all knowledge is relative, that 
there is a subjective element to all knowledge and research, and that holistic, ungeneralizable 
studies are justifiable” (Nunan, 1992). Texts are purposively selected, examined and compared in 
order to picture the social reality through themes and categories developed by the researcher in a 
subjective yet scientific style. The description of such a particular setting can then be used for the 
validation of existing or the development of new theories. While qualitative content analysis does 
not exclude a deductive classification (Patton, 2002), the immersion in the data to allow new 
perceptions to emerge (Kondracki & Wellman, 2002) is also defined as inductive category 
development (Mayring, 2000). This approach is appropriate when former knowledge on a 
phenomenon is limited and as such investigators avoid using any predetermined categories from 
literature, instead allowing categories to come from the data (Kondracki & Wellman, 2002).  
 In contrast to the quantitative content analysis, the qualitative content analysis allows the 
assignment of data to more than one category (Tesch, 1990). Particularly at the initial phase, the 
categorization can be puzzling due to unexpected difficulties that may arise (Glaser, 1978) or due 
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to several, seemingly unconnected pieces of information (Backman & Kynga¨s, 1998). Besides the 
obligation to cover the whole dataset (Graneheim & Lundman, 2004), this categorization scheme 
should be a logical, systematic and comprehensible process meant to guarantee the trustworthiness 
and credibility of the study (Folger, Hewes & Poole, 1984). It should be conceptually 
understandable and show a link between the results and the data (Polit & Beck, 2004). For that, 
other data display methods such as graphs and charts may be included (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
 Based on the degree of involvement of inductive reasoning as well as the substantive 
interest of the researcher on the problem (Weber, 1990), Hsieh and Shannon (2005) deliberated 
three studies to content analysis: Conventional CA, Directed CA, and Summative CA. Observable 
in Table 2, in the conventional technique categories are derived directly and inductively through 
observation from the raw data. Hence, the researcher obtains a rich understanding of the 
phenomena. The directed content analysis uses a far more deductive approach because it starts with 
a theory and its pre-set categories in order to validate a conceptual framework. Lastly, the 
summative content analysis starts with counting keywords but is distinctive from a quantitative 
methodology due to its exploration on the usage of words in an inductive way. Table 2 depicts the  
usual coding differences among three approaches to Content Analysis.  
 
Table 2 - Major coding differences among three approaches to Content Analysis 




Categories are defined during data 
analysis 




Categories are defined before and 
during analysis 
Categories are derived from theory 




Keywords are identified before and 
during data analysis 
Keywords are derived from 
interest of researchers or review of 
literature 
 (Author´s table adapted from Hsieh and Shannnon, 2005)  
 
 For the sake of this study, a Conventional Content Analysis was applied to analyse the 
digital text data within the chosen newspaper journals. In other words, the study started with an 
observation and comprehensive reading of Olympic Games articles with no definite and pre-set 
theory in mind, as theory was unable to categorize any of the news. Categories were therefore 
derived from the raw data.    
33 
 
3.2.2  Interview  
 
Data collection can be derived from a number of methods such as interviews, focus groups, 
surveys and questionnaires. Therefore, which data collection method to use would depend upon its 
goals and the advantages and disadvantages of each method. In the light of qualitative research that 
offers a variety of suitable techniques (Cresswell, 1994), interviews are one to give a contextual 
meaning and insight into a social phenomenon (Mays & Pope, 1996; Kendall, 2008). In other 
words, Kvale (1983) defines the qualitative research interview as "an interview, whose purpose is 
to gather descriptions of the life-world of the interviewee with respect to interpretation of the 
meaning of the described phenomena". 
In the view of literature (Gill, Stewart, Treasure, & Chadwick, 2008; Morse & Corbin, 
2003) there are three central forms of research interviews that present slight variations in structure 
and conduct: Structured, Semi-structured and Unstructured interviews. Contained within are 
“tightly structured, survey interviews with pre-set, standardised, normally closed questions (and 
on) the other end of the continuum … open-ended, apparently structured, anthropological 
interviews” (Seidman, 1998). According to Morse & Corbin (2003), the main difference between 
the approaches is “the degree to which participants have control over the process and content of 
the interview”. Still, there is no single interview style that fits every occasion. 
  The structured interview is, as the name already suggests, a rigid instrument in which 
respondents are asked to answer within fixed, closed and predetermined set of responses (Corbetta, 
2003). As they typically comprise serious constraints on the range of response, data is easily 
collected often analysed quantitatively. Advantages of the structured interview are grounded on the 
control of the researcher that follows his interview guide. However, adhering too closely to a guide 
may provide no “depth” and little scope for follow up questions.  
 In semi-structured interviews “the researcher has a list of questions or fairly specific topics 
to be covered, (...) but the interviewee has a great deal of leeway in how to reply” (Bryman, 2004). 
At this more flexible approach, pre-set open-ended questions are employed by the researcher on 
the participant, encouraging him to provide detail and clarification on certain themes and topics. 
As the interviewer does not seek to test a specific hypothesis (David & Sutton, 2004), data is 
explored on a qualitative basis. 
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 More casual and non-directed than the aforementioned examples, the unstructured 
interviews are described by Morse & Corbin (2003) as an involvement “in which researchers and 
interviewees come together to create a context of conversational intimacy in which participants 
feel comfortable telling their story”. Resembling more a conversation with minimal hold on any 
preconceived theories or ideas, unrestricted questions are generated instantaneously and 
subjectively as personal experiences and perspectives are related during the interview. While 
validity and reliability of the interview data may be questionable, there is also a high potential for 
experienced interviewers to obtain new insights when little or no knowledge exists about a topic. 
As a further complement to this study, an in-person semi structured interview was 
performed by the investigator to a member of the Organising Committee of the Olympic Games. 
The approximately two hour long interview was held in Portuguese and took place in a small, quite 
coffee shop in Rio de Janeiro on the 19th of December 2016. No formal token of appreciation was 
given to the interviewed person. Outcomes were audio-recorded and transcribed to enable a 
comprehensive analysis of the content. Listed in table 3, the semi structured interview covered the 
following themes and its corresponding key points and objectives:  
 
Table 3 - Semi - structured interview process 




 Who are principal project actors of Rio 
2016? 
 To get a clear picture and background 
information on the main project actors 
of Rio 2016 
 
Issues on Rio 
2016 
 How did the project actors handle the 
upcoming issues raised by the media 
from May 2016 to November 2016? 
 To depict the issues in light of the 
project governance picture 
 
 To establish a matrix of responsibility 
The media as an 
informing party 
on Rio 2016 
 How did the OCOG deal with the 
media? 
 
 Was the media reporting honest, clear 
and transparent? 
 To understand the behavioural patterns 






3.2.3 Newspaper selection  
 
 The preparation and implementation of events similar to the Olympic Games are covered 
constantly by the media (Masterman, 2004; Rofner, 2009). With that in mind, the selection process 
of newspapers took place under four distinct phases, which will be all further described below. 
Step 1 depicts the preliminary conditions set by the author regarding sample size. Step 2 depicts 
the accredited newspaper rankings found through the google search engine. Step 3 follows with an 
evaluation of the potential candidate journals according to four distinct criteria: Language, 
Keyword match, Timeline fulfilment and Premium content requirement. Step 4 identifies the 
selected journals to consider in this analysis. 
 
 Step 1: Preliminary conditions of the author 
 
 In order to obtain a broader perspective, both domestic and international newspapers were 
intended to be chosen for data collection. A first condition would be the selection of a local journal 
from Rio de Janeiro since coverage from a newspaper company headquartered in the host city is 
expected to be more extensive and detailed. In order to counterbalance possible biases from the 
local coverage, another Brazilian newspaper should be identified. The third condition would be the 
inclusion of two international high ranked journals, to match the sample size of Brazilian 
newspapers and in order to guarantee a balanced source of information. 
  
 Step 2: Identification of newspaper rankings 
 
 Expert evaluation on newspapers at domestic and international scale had to be found. 
Through the google search engine, two distinct newspaper classifications were identified.  
 The ranking for local newspapers was obtained through the Associação Nacional de Jornais 
(ANJ). Here, the standings are based upon the largest circulating paid journals in 2015.   
 The classification for international periodicals was set by the Newspaper Web Ranking 
(NWR). Contemplating data of 2016, it is based upon an algorithm from three different search 




 Step 3: Criteria for the evaluation of potential candidate newspapers 
 
 Next, the author evaluated top placed journals on four self-established criteria, explained in 
table 4. Those were the reported language of the articles, the keyword match in each search engines 
of the website, the timeline fulfilment consisting of three months prior and after to the staging of 
the event, and finally the potential absence of a premium account requirement.  
 
Table 4 - Criteria for selection of the newspapers 
Criteria  Description 
1st – Language 
Articles should be in Portuguese or English, languages in which the author is a 
fluent speaker. 
2nd –  Keyword match 
The digital newspaper website should have a considerable amount of information 
regarding the Olympic project under the keyword “Olympic Games” / “Jogos 
Olímpicos”. 
3rd  –  Timeline fulfilment 
The digital newspaper website should have news coverage 3 months prior and 
after to the Rio 2016 Summer Games. As such, the analysis will include coverage 
starting on the 1st May 2015 and reporting until 31th November 2016. 
4th –  Premium content 
requirement 
The digital newspaper website should preferably not oblige for a premium account 
in order to collect the data, unless it involves a small monetary value. 
        (Author´s table) 
 
 Step 4: Identification of newspapers for analysis 
 
 Taking into account the abovementioned steps before, table 5 shows the chosen newspapers 
for data analysis. Note that the first ranked Brazilian journal, Super Notícia, was not included 
in this analysis as it did not appear in a check-up of the international NWR ranking. 
 
Table 5 - Selected Newspapers for analysis 





O Globo Rio de Janeiro #2 (ANJ) “Jogos Olímpicos” Yes Yes 
Folha de São Paulo São Paulo #3 (ANJ) “Jogos Olímpicos” Yes Yes 
The New York Times 
United States 
of America 
#1 (NWR) “Olympic Games” Yes Yes 
The Guardian Great Britain #2 (NWR) “Olympic Games” Yes No 




3.2.4 Data collection from the newspaper articles 
 
 The aforementioned journals were analysed individually and manually by the researcher of 
this paper. As a first step and according to the formal language of the journals, each newspaper 
search engine was typed in with the keyword “Jogos Olímpicos” or “Olympic Games”.  
 Confronted by the large amounts of brute information that also included reporting from past 
Olympic events, the second step embraced a filtering of the total output delivered by each 
periodical.  For that, each journal´s results from their respective search engines were limited to the 
start of May 2016 until the November 2016. Taking into account that the Games of Rio took place 
in August 2016, the chosen timeline presented all the news three months prior and three months 
after to the execution of the project.  
 The third step included a one by one listing of all the results by article title, date of 
publication, author and website link in Microsoft Excel, the unique supporting software of this 
research. Data sets of each journal were collected under a separate spreadsheet.  
 After a free and inductive reading of each article and by means of a conventional and 
inductive CA, categorization of each article was prepared with the unique purpose of englobing a 
project management perspective on the Olympic Games. Remember that the qualitative content 
analysis allows the assignment of data to more than one category (Tesch, 1990). Particularly at the 
initial phase, the categorization was difficult due to several, seemingly unconnected pieces of 
information (Backman & Kynga¨s, 1998). With that in mind, several categories raised by the 
author, like sport results on days of competition, were evaluated individually. If considered to have 
no further impact on the main project actors of Rio 2016, the articles under irrelevant categories 
were excluded from the researcher´s database. On top of that, a specific category should be present 
across all journals by other journals for a further comparison between standpoints. If this was not 
the case, the issue would be excluded for the analysis, but kept in the spreadsheets.   
 Figure 1 presents the step-by-step just described above. Table 6, 7, 8, 9 exhibit the total 
number of project related news and its subsequent rate of utilization left from the total sample of 
analysis of each newspaper. In other words, it depicts the total number of results found across the 
four units of analysis, under the imposed time window and the respective keyword. Table 10 




Figure 1 - Step by step process of the conventional and inductive CA 
 
  (Author´s figure) 
 
 
Table 6 - Total number of raw data, project related data and utilization rate from O Globo 
O Globo Total number of articles Project related Utilization rate (in %) 
November 69 17 25 
October 86 25 29 
September 267 65 24 
August 1047 197 19 
July 535 169 32 
June 306 84 27 
May 218 53 24 
TOTAL 2528 610 24 













               
               (Author´s table) 
  
       















S.Paulo Total number of articles Project related Utilization rate (in %) 
November 43 13 8 
October 63 17 7 
September 95 34 36 
August 633 135 21 
July 408 170 42 
June 246 103 42 
May 154 70 45 
TOTAL 1642 542 33 
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Table 8 - Total number of raw data, project related data and utilization rate from the New York Times 
NY Times Total number of articles Project related Utilization rate (in %) 
November 2 1 50 
October 2 1 50 
September 7 5 71 
August 431 84 19 
July 121 51 42 
June 75 28 37 
May 24 14 58 
TOTAL 662 184 28 
                                     (Author´s table) 
 
 












Table 10 - Excluded categories classified as non-project related or underrepresented 
Sports related Results of day of competitions or athlete profiles.   
Arts News related to paintings and other artistic undertakings. 
Food Receipts and gastronomical recommendations of the hosting city. 
Culture & Tourism Historical recordings and touristic attractions of Rio de Janeiro. 
Media Broadcasting numbers and statistics.  
Bibliographies Description of past celebrities related to the Olympic project.  
Interviews Often not fact based.  
Ceremonies News about the stage performance of the ceremonies.  
Digital libraries Digital content such as photo and video galleries.  
Columns Opinion based articles as they are not solely fact – based.  
Workforce Underrepresented theme in New York Times. News related to 
workforce conditions around the project.  
                    (Author´s table)  
The Guardian Total number of articles Project related Utilization rate (in %) 
November 16 5 31 
October 42 10 24 
September 65 21 32 
August 991 117 12 
July 206 41 20 
June 89 32 36 
May 85 40 47 
TOTAL 1494 266 18 
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3.3  Limitations  
 
For the scope of this research, four newspapers were chosen: One American, one British 
and two Brazilian. Desirably for this study, a larger amount of influential newspapers would have 
been counted in but time and language constraints on the author impeded a broader inclusion of 
research samples. After all, conducting a content analysis calls for a professional, persistent and 
time consuming working approach from the researcher. However, the absence of other renowned 
newspapers from countries such as France or Germany should not be regarded as a weak spot of 
this study. As commonly observable in modern democratic countries, the Inter-media agenda 
phenomena is widely spread on today´s media reporting and consequently leads to a large pool of 
similar and overlapping information (Golan, 2006) . To overcome that particularity in this analysis, 
a mix between local and international newspapers was selected in order to provide a clearer picture 
of the project environment. In addition, data collection on digital newspaper showed to be more 
difficult than previously expected. Excluded candidate journals of this study showed more than a 
few weaknesses that severely limited the possibility of conducting a rigorous content analysis. As 
such, the three imposed criteria for newspaper selection (Availability of information, Timeline 
fulfilment and Absence of premium content) were commonly not met by other potential 
periodicals. Regarding the first criteria, search machines frequently brought no matching results 
for the keyword “Olympic Games”, nor did they provide any distinctive news section for the sport 
event. Moreover, corresponding results were often mere sport related issues or confounded with 
opinion based articles that were not included in the scope of this analysis. Furthermore, a 
considerable amount of newspaper websites did not meet the timeline requirement: Most of the 
times, reported news on Rio 2016 only took place during the Olympic Games or followed no 
chronological order. As a result, the construction of a dataset from May 2016 to November 2016 
became an unviable task. Last but not least, the necessity for paid subscription models also hindered 
a broader inclusion of newspaper sources. 
The predominant use of newspaper articles inevitably links to other core disciplines such 
as communication sciences. Those skills are not of deep knowledge to the author but at the same 
time not the purpose of the research. Hence, the possibly different journalistic science based 
functions and theories applicable to each newspaper will be disregarded throughout this study: An 
agenda-setting role, in which “The mass media force attention to certain issues, (…) constantly 
41 
 
presenting objects suggesting what individuals in the mass should think about, know about, have 
feelings about.” (Lang & Lang, 1966). Secondly, the gatekeeper role that “simply put, (…) is the 
process by which the billions of messages that are available in the world get cut down and 
transformed into the hundreds of messages that reach a given person on a given day. (It) involves 
every aspect of message selection, handling and control” (Shoemaker, 1991). Lastly, the watchdog 
role wherein the media takes a crucial position in monitoring the conduct of governmental 
decisions. Other media concepts and theories limit the data source validation: For example, the 
falling viewership interest on once hot topics is described by the Downs Attention-Issue Cycles. 
For that reason, newspaper reporting on a particular topic can suddenly fall short even it is remains 
unsolved. As any other content analysis on newspaper articles, this research is also expected to be 
influenced by other concepts such priming, framing and/or indexing theory. In effect, the objective 
of this paper is to stick to a project management point of view rather than a journalistic based 
perspective.  
 Further limitations can be set on the conventional content analysis and the interview as a 
qualitative research method. As already mentioned before, a conventional CA relies on a strict yet 
subjective interpretation of the social reality. In other words, the categorization process of the 
dataset is the researcher´s cognitive learning process and may not be fully apprehended by the 
readership. His line of seem thinking must be trackable throughout the whole study, otherwise 
credibility falls short for his work. Results not only need to be strictly linked to the dataset, but 
they should also follow assumptions established before. Finally, the interpersonal nature of face-
to-face interviews may be considered as socially desirable and contextually based results (Fontana 
& Frey 2000; Silverman, 2000, 2006; Richman, Keisler, Weisband, & Drasgow, 1999; Yin, 2009). 
This characteristic is augmented by the usual small sample sizes of qualitative studies that lead to 
hardly replicable or universal conclusions (Bryman, 2008). At a first glance, inferences that were 
extracted from only one interview harm the trustworthiness of this study.  With that in mind, the 
reader should be aware about the difficulty in reaching a person as suitable as the one interviewed 
for this study, with a long experience and a swift career within the different areas in the Organising 







4.  ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS 
 
 In order to introduce the reader to the Olympic project, chapter 4.1 shortly explains the 
governance of the Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro. Under chapter 4.2 follows an illustration of 
all the elected project – related events that impacted one or more of the project actors of Rio 2016. 
The third section of this chapter is an explanation of all the dimensions that the reader should keep 
in mind before reaching chapter 4.4, the core part of this analysis. Here, the management of project 
– related issues during the execution of Rio 2016 is going to be investigated taking into account 
the dimensions mentioned in chapter 4.3.   
 
4.1  Project Governance of Rio 2016 
 
 Unlike to any other modern edition of the Olympic Games, Rio 2016 was mostly planned 
by three actors, depicted in figure 2: The International Committee of the Olympic Games, the local 
Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games and the Government. Due to the reason that the 
collected articles or any other bibliographic source did not elucidate the role of those teams and 
what their main responsibilities were, an interview was conducted to a member of the OCOG 
precisely to answer the question: Who are principal project actors of Rio 2016 and what do they 
do? The upcoming explanations were solely based on the interview.  
 


















4.1.1  The International Committee of the Olympic Games  
  
The IOC sells the Olympic project to the bidding cities through a selective process. The 
bid commitment between IOC and the chosen city is a premise for further development mainly 
through the legacy of infrastructure projects. The IOC can be considered to a large consultant 
company, which aims to sell the Olympic project with its respective master schedule and other 
milestones. At the same time, the Committee´s knowledge in prior events is used to monitor, to 
impose the submission of the city´s action plans and finally to validate them. One example is the 
requirement to present the first transportation and mobility plan two years prior to the opening 
ceremony of the Olympic Games. Moreover, the Olympic Committee is a mediator to all other 
international federations. This means that they were present in every meeting to discuss the 
various plans from alimentation, security, transportation and logistics presented by the OCOG of 
Rio de Janeiro. Those meetings, held twice a year since 2009 (later four times a year since 2014), 
were mandatory in presence for all the affected stakeholders groups: Clients, suppliers, 
federations, media, broadcasters, sponsors. The IOC has no executive power, but they levy on 
contracts and agreements established with the hosting city prior to the Olympic Games. 
Noteworthy to mention is the fact that the IOC owns the world´s most expensive brand name and 
brings the biggest sponsorships to the city. 
To sum up, the responsibility of the IOC was to sell and consult the Rio 2016 project, sign 
the initial contracts and agreements with the hosting city and finally to validate all the 
submissions and plans presented by the OCOG. 
 
 
4.1.2 The Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games  
  
The OCOG was the local project team operating in the hosting city. Its role in the project 
can be understood as a service provider aimed to provide everything to keep the Olympic Games 
operational and smooth. This includes food, housing, transportation and logistics through signed 
contracts with shuttle and catering services, as an example. The mobility of spectators, athletes 
and journalists inside the venues is therefore a task accounted to the OCOG, which is ultimately 
sponsored by the IOC . Among ticket selling, most planning efforts are dedicated to the 
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compliance with the rules of sport: A lot of expertise from each sport was brought to Rio de 
Janeiro in order to guarantee the professional execution of the Olympic Games. 
The OCOG should be also regarded as a private organization with the benefit of complete 
or partial tax exemptions, depending on the tax involved. In 2009, the local project team´s 
workforce was composed mostly of IOC members with prior experience in their respective 
functional areas during the planning process of other Olympic Games. Their objective was to 
teach and share their expertise with local staff in order to gradually dissolve themselves from the 
team. As such, the OCOG became increasingly of Brazilian nationality as the Games approached. 
Those IOC consultants then moved to the bidding committees of the next hosting cities.    
 
 
4.1.3  The Brazilian Government  
 
 The Brazilian government had the obligation to provide the necessary infrastructure, 
transportation and security to execute the project, an agreement solely established between the 
government and the IOC. After that, the government rented pre-existing venues as well as new 
ones to the OCOG through a Venue User Agreement (VUA). The local project team therefore 
became an exclusive right holder to use the space in accordance to all the obligatory maintenance 
requirements. Despite the singularities of each VUA, most of did not charge any monetary 
compensation to the OCOG as long as basic maintenance and service costs were covered.  
 Prior to the selection of the hosting city in 2009, the government created a small department. 
Designated as Public Olympic Authority or Autoridade Pública Olímpica (APO), the team´s task 













4.2 Elected project – related events for analysis  
 
 The elected events were only obtained through a free categorization of each article across 
all the four newspapers. Remember that if considered to have no further impact on the main project 
actors of Rio 2016, the articles under irrelevant categories were excluded from the researcher´s 
database. On top of that, a specific event should be present across all journals by other journals for 
a further comparison between standpoints. If this was not the case, the issue would be excluded for 
the analysis. Table 11 illustrates the elected events for further analysis.  
 
Table 11 - Elected events from May 2016 to November 2016 
Events Description 
Bidding Countries Facts related to upcoming and candidate countries for the Olympic Games. 
Boxing scandal Corruption allegations to the jury of the boxing federation. 
Crisis Political and financial crisis of Brazil. 
Doping scandal Russia and its state-sponsored doping mechanisms on athletes. 
Environment A governmental plan to clean up Guanabara Bay, a promise in Rio´s Olympic bid. 
Infrastructure 
News related to the Olympic park, the Olympic Village, other sportive venues and 
the construction of urban infrastructure projects. 
Mobility 
Articles mentioning the transportation systems constructed for the Olympic Games, 
more specifically the Metro Line 4, the VLT and the BRT. 
Pat Hickey Arrest of an Olympic executive accused of fraudulent ticket sales. 
Ryan Lochte 
The incidents involving American swimmers and an alleged gunpoint robbery 
undertaken by a local police officer. 
Security Security operations in the city of Rio de Janeiro. 
Ticket Sales performance Ticket sales performed by the OCOG. 
Zika The threat of a mosquito virus proven to cause a severe birth defect in babies. 
(Author´s table) 
 
 The abovementioned events were identified across all journals, but some newspapers 
emphasized specific topic more than others. Applied to each newspaper, the following four tables 
(Table 12, 13, 14, 15) going to portrait how many articles were related to an event, as well as the 
event´s relative importance compared to the other listed issues. The summary of all newspapers 
together is represented through figure 3. This relation was named topic weight. Remember that 
each article can have more than one category, meaning that the topic weight was not calculated on 
the total amount of articles found in the data collection of chapter 3.2.4, but on the total number of 
attributed categorizations (which is logically higher than the total number of articles found) 




Table 12 - O Globo: Number of articles by event and respective topic weight 
O Globo Nr. of articles by event Topic Weight (in %) 
Bidding countries 10 2 
Boxing scandal 4 1 
Crisis 107 17 
Doping 45 7 
Environment 27 4 
Infrastructure 141 22 
Mobility 116 18 
Pat Hickey 5 1 
Ryan Lochte 8 1 
Security 121 19 
Ticket Sales 30 5 
Zika 21 3 
TOTAL 635 100 
                 (Author´s table) 
 
 
Table 13 - Folha São Paulo: Number of articles by event and respective topic weight 
S.Paulo Nr. of articles by event Topic Weight (in %) 
Bidding countries 10 2 
Boxing scandal 5 1 
Crisis 150 26 
Doping 93 16 
Environment 12 2 
Infrastructure 85 15 
Mobility 28 5 
Pat Hickey 7 1 
Ryan Lochte 13 2 
Security 99 17 
Ticket Sales 37 6 
Zika 36 6 
TOTAL 575 100 





Table 14 - New York Times: Number of articles by event and respective topic weight 
 
              (Author´s table) 
 
 
Table 15 - The Guardian: Number of articles by event and respective topic weight 
The Guardian Nr. of articles by event Topic Weight (in %) 
Bidding Countries 19 7 
Boxing scandal 9 3 
Crisis 8 3 
Doping 102 37 
Environment 4 1 
Infrastructure 20 7 
Mobility 3 1 
Pat Hickey 13 5 
Ryan Lochte 20 7 
Security 18 6 
Ticket Sales 28 10 
Zika 34 12 
TOTAL 278 100 
             (Author´s table) 
 
NY Times Nr. of articles by event Topic Weight (in %) 
Bidding countries 3 2 
Boxing scandal 8 4 
Crisis 20 11 
Doping 73 38 
Environment 7 4 
Infrastructure 15 8 
Mobility 2 1 
Pat Hickey 2 1 
Ryan Lochte 14 7 
Security 13 7 
Ticket Sales 3 2 
Zika 30 16 
TOTAL 190 100 
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Figure 3 - Project related articles by event from May 2016 to November 2016 
 












O Globo Folha S. Pãulo New York Times The Guardian
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4.3  Dimensions to consider on this analysis of project related events 
 
 The aforementioned issues were all considered as project related events that had to be dealt 
by one of the three main actors of the projects. All of those occurrences were studied on three 
fundamental dimensions, which were:  
 
 1st Dimension: Out of the three main project actors, who got affected by the event?  
 
 2nd Dimension: How did international and local media report about the event?  
Note: On this dimension, newspapers were cited in order to characterize 
their standpoint related to a specific issue. Moreover, each periodical 
was analysed for the total number of articles reported on each event and 
the topic weight, demonstrated in the previous chapter. Finally, the 
timing of publications in percentage to the total number of articles 
reported was also taken into consideration when reporting about an 
issue.   
 
 3rd Dimension: How did the event impact the Olympic project actors?  
   Note: Each event impacted the project teams in different ways. To stick 
to a strict megaproject perspective, the author evaluated each event for 
the potential political, aesthetic, economic and technological impacts on 
the project actors. Those impacts were inspired by Flyvberg´s four 











4.4  Management of project – related issues during the execution of Rio 2016 
 
 Please note that extractions from O Globo and Folha de São Paulo were, by all means of 
the author, translated to English. Also take into account that quotes were indexed (from the Excel 
spreadsheet) as they were treated as primary data. Supporting figures and tables are illustrated at 
the end of each subchapter.  
 
4.4.1 Bidding countries 
 
 While the project was marked by a challenging preparatory phase to record breaking results 
from athletes during the Olympic Games, the media still reported, even if not much (Table 16), on 
the upcoming and candidate countries to stage the next greatest sporting event of the world. 
Unfortunately for the image of the project, those were not only dispersed through the months (Table 
17) but also of negative nature. 
 In May 2016, French financial prosecutors confirmed investigations into Tokyo´s 2020 
bidding team. On the table were suspect payments to secret accounts that, ironically enough, were 
supposed to be revoked as “(…) an independent panel appointed by the Japanese Olympic 
Committee (JOC) said the $2.3m (£1.74m) payment to Black Tidings, a Singapore-based 
consultancy, was legitimate and had been made in return for consulting services. The report also 
concedes that the $2m-plus sum paid (...) was double the average paid to other consultants the city 
had used during the bidding process” (Guardian 35).  
 Unsurprisingly on France´s behalf, the report was considered vague and investigations are 
still carried on. Corruption on megaprojects is present, and Olympic Games are no exception. Large 
sums of money are invested to establish an attractive candidate file and by that, candidate cities try 
to mitigate the risk of not being elected through the payment for privileged information or even 
votes. The Olympic project is comparable an auction, where the most attractive bidder gets the 
project.  Furthermore, the Tokyo bid showed once more the complexity surrounding megaprojects. 
Japanese planners seemed to be victims of the over optimism bias, being overwhelmed by 
excessive ambitions while clearly underestimating costs. The IOC, in his major consultant role, did 
not agree with Japan´s organising committee whose predictions reached alarming values of $20bn 
to $30bn – four times the initial estimate. In strong alignment between the IOC and the Japanese 
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government, cost-reducing measures include the reallocations of some events to South Korea, 
hundreds of miles away. Apart of the honourable decision to include more youth attracting sports 
such as skating, surfing, and karate in the event, IOC vice-president John Coates, doesn´t “(…) 
want to let the international media have the impression that the costs of running the Games in a 
city like Tokyo, where you have so many existing venues, is $20bn. It is not, and there will be 
significant savings to be found” (The Guardian 1).  
 Taking into account the aforementioned discussion, this particular event affected the IOC 
at a political level and aesthetical level. Through his already strong interaction and debate with the 
next hosting city government about the alarming predictions, the skyrocketing costs alarmed other 
potential candidate countries. Countries that could be potential clients for the IOC. The New York 
Times described “An Olympic Event Where 1st Prize Is the Chance to Lose Billions”. Such 
headlines obviously affected the IOC´s image and consequently, candidate countries reacted to the 
warning signals that were sent to them: Italy suspended its Rome 2024 Olympic bid after Rio-2016. 
“(Rome) believes that the event represents an unnecessary cost to the city, which is going through 
financial difficulties. (…) Los Angeles, Paris and Budapest are still on stage. Boston and Hamburg 
also declined” (O Globo 58).  
 
Table 16 - Total number of articles and topic weight across each journal for the event “Bidding Countries” 
Bidding Countries Articles Topic weight (%) 
O Globo 10 2 
Folha S. Paulo 10 2 
New York Times 3 2 
The Guardian 19 7 
            (Author´s table) 
 
Table 17 - Timing and proportion of publications for the event "Bidding Countries" 
Bidding Countries O Globo Folha S. Paulo New York Times The Guardian 
November 10 10 0 16 
October 10 30 0 21 
September 30 20 0 16 
August 50 0 100 5 
July 0 0 0 0 
June 0 0 0 0 
May 0 40 0 42 




4.4.2 Boxing scandal 
 
 Mentioned before in the project governance of Rio 2016, the local Organizing Committee 
of the Olympic Games did substantial efforts to hire judging expertise from each sports federation. 
Considering that the largest stage of sports consisted of 28 different sports, the interviewed person 
highlighted that this commitment was grounded on the intrinsic effort of the local project team to 
please their main stakeholder, the athletes. After all, their “(…) life-long dedication to reach the 
world’s largest stage of sport should be supported by a serious, objective and professional judging 
procedure” (Interview).   
 Nevertheless, the Guardian´s corruption allegations on the eve of the Games and directed 
towards the jury of the Amateur International Boxing Association (Aiba) demonstrated that despite 
all planning procedures, the local project team was not on track to conform all athletes. This 
obviously set aesthetic damages to the team in Rio as the media already started to question the 
capabilities of the OCOG to guarantee a fair competition. Unfortunately for the local project team, 
the ongoing claims of wider corruption at the Rio boxing tournament were confirmed during the 
event. Several dubious matches created outrage over a string of contentious decisions that lead to 
booing spectators inside the venues, with one of the athletes, Michael Conlan, “(…) gaining 
notoriety during the Games by showing (obscene gestures) to the jury after losing to the Russian 
Vladimir Nitikin” (Folha S. Paulo 33).     
 The fact that the IOC was not directly involved in the judging selection process did not 
hinder the negative impressions laid upon this project actor. A loss in credibility in one sport is 
synonym to a loss in credibility in the Olympic brand name, and consequently to the brand holder, 
the IOC. With that in mind, it becomes understandable that the IOC should be interested in 
maintaining, in the best possible ways, a stain-free reputational project in regard to the judging 
criteria. If this image is polished by the project actors’ decision to remove several high ranked 
judges during the event is questionable because no statements were given for such a choice. The 
New York Times (20) further doubted the credibility of the sport, and as such the project: “Were 
(the judges) dismissed because of some more serious impropriety like bribery and corruption, (…) 
or is the shake-up merely a gesture meant to aggrieve aggrieved boxers and fans?” 
 Notwithstanding the serious aesthetical damages this event brought to the IOC and to the 
OCOG, the media did not report at high levels regarding this issue (Table 18).   
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Table 18 - Total number of articles and topic weight across each journal for the event “Boxing scandal” 
Boxing scandal Articles Topic weight (in %) 
O Globo 4 1 
Folha S. Paulo 5 1 
New York Times 8 4 
The Guardian 9 3 
   (Author´s table) 
 
 
4.4.3  Crisis  
 
 In October 2009, the announcement of Rio de Janeiro as the hosting city of the XXXI 
Olympiad was followed by a holiday for city and state employees, with tens of thousands of people 
celebrating on the city’s Copacabana beach. An emotional president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 
stated that he never felt so much pride in Brazil, promising that his country would show its 
greatness to the world.  
Seven years later, the Olympic project faced drastically different economic, social and 
political conditions. The country´s economy shrank by almost 4% of its gross domestic product, 
with the state government of Rio de Janeiro tightening health, police and education as a result of 
falling tax revenues. Delayed payments to teachers, doctors and retired state employees prompted 
strikes and occupations in deplorable schools and hospitals. High ranked politicians and senior 
executives were exposed in large-scale corruption scandals involving Petrobras, the state-run oil 
company headquartered in the host city. In Mid-May of 2016, the political paralysis culminated 
when Dilma Rousseff, Lula’s handpicked successor (Lula himself is under investigation), was 
suspended from her presidential powers and duties while she faced impeachment trial. Michel 
Temer became acting president, formally taking office on 31st August 2016. 
In light of this highly unpredictable and unstainable political spectrum, media coverage 
around this issue exercised less than two months before the opening of the Olympics. Governor of 
Rio de Janeiro Francisco Dornelles confirmed a state of “public calamity” - a declaration usually 
associated with a natural disaster - acknowledging that the state was bankrupt and would be unable 
to honour its commitment to the Olympics without federal support. “This is everything that we did 
not want happening at this moment. It’s not easy to host the Olympics in the current Brazilian 
environment” said Rio’s mayor and member of Mr. Temer’s party, Eduardo Paes (New York Times 
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15). The Guardian (213) evaluated “the plea for funds (as) an embarrassment for the host of South 
America’s first Games. and adds to a long list of woes that includes the impeachment of the 
president, the deepest recession in decades, the biggest corruption scandal in memory, the Zika 
epidemic and a wave of strikes and occupations of government buildings”. A complete collapse of 
the public system was avoided through the federal disbursement of 2.9bn Brazilian real ($860m), 
earmarked mainly for security and for the completion of Rio´s subway extensions to transport 
visitors to Olympic venues. Taking into consideration the economic situation of the country, 
needless to say were the reactions that this emergency loan brought up around the Olympic project 
and the Government. As such, the Olympic spirit was marked by tension inside and outside of the 
venues. Among public “Out with Temer" protests pleading the removal politician whom many 
accuse of trying to gain power he could never have obtained at the ballot box, torch relays were 
stoned and invaded. International readership who did not pay significant attention to the news were 
most lately alarmed when assisting the opening spectacle of the Olympic Games: Booed at opening 
ceremony, Brazil's acting president skipped to attend the closing ceremony of the Olympic Games. 
A new appearance on the opening ceremony of the Paralympic Games did not save him from 
another blameful reception of the crowd: “As uniform as the “ola” that united the spectators of the 
Maracanã, were the plainly booing’s heard (…) at the smallest referrals to the federal government. 
The president Michel Temer was, once again, greeted with a chorus of boos inside the Maracanã 
Stadium” (O Globo 93). Competitions inside arenas served not only to watch the best athletes of 
the world, but they also served as places of political demonstration. “Most worrisome, many say, 
is what happens after the tens of thousands of soldiers and military police personnel who were 
dispatched to Rio for the Games go back to their home states. A police union official has warned 
of strikes should the city´s police force go unpaid” (New York Times 15). 
The financial and political situation of the government had a severe financial impact on the 
OCOG. Brazilian organizers had to cut about $500 million from the Olympic budget — affecting 
varied aspects of the Games including the pared back opening and closing ceremonies to the 
athletes’ dorm rooms that didn´t have televisions. As such, the OCOG saw no other option than to 
cut several benefits for the athletes, their principal stakeholder. Furthermore, the change of political 
power represented a Red Flag for the project team as it forced the revision of several contracts with 
the government, like the Venue User Agreements. Even “(…) through the exceptional capability 
of the local government and the OCOG to attract private partners to fund the Olympic Games, 
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which covered 60% of the budget” (Interview), the financial situation of the OCOG became further 
evident after the Olympic Games: Half a year later, the electric bill of the iconic Maracanã Stadium 
is still due to pay, leaving the venue now unoccupied and shut down until payments take place. Nor 
the OCOG, nor the government are providing any solution.  
On the contrary to what a reader may expect, media reporting from local newspapers was 
way more intense and critic on this topic (Table 19). Among the international newspapers, only the 
NYT clearly tackled this issue. While most of the news were issued around the proclamation of 
Rio de Janeiro´s state of emergence up to the Olympic Games, local media continued to report after 
the event finished (Table 20).  
 
 
Table 19 - Total number of articles and topic weight across each journal for the event “Crisis" 
Crisis Articles Topic weight (in %) 
O Globo 107 17 
Folha S. Paulo 150 26 
New York Times 20 11 
The Guardian 8 3 
   (Author´s table) 
 
 
Table 20 - Timing and proportion of publications for the event "Crisis" 
Crisis O Globo Folha S. Paulo New York Times The Guardian 
November 2 4 5 0 
October 11 5 0 0 
September 9 7 0 0 
August 20 24 70 63 
July 17 20 10 0 
June 31 23 10 38 
May 10 17 5 0 
 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 







4.4.4  Doping scandal 
 
 The Olympic Games were marked by the Russian doping scandal, an important political 
issue for the IOC and that turned to be by far the most spoken topic for three out of the four analysed 
journals (Table 21) at the months preceding the event (Table 22).  As a headquartered newspaper 
in the hosting city, O Globo shifted its investigative journalism to areas that were related to the 
delivery of the Olympic project such as Infrastructure, Mobility and Security. 
Accusations were dominantly targeted towards Russia and its alleged state-sponsored 
doping mechanisms on athletes, an ongoing process since whistle-blowers voiced the German 
broadcaster Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (ARD) about the scale of Russia’s cheating in late 2014. The report exposed findings 
about a sabotaged and systematic doping on the London 2012 Olympics, where Russian athletes 
with suspicious doping profiles didn´t suffer consequent monitoring mechanisms from their 
respective sport federations. In the meantime, a ban from international competitions was set by the 
sport’s governing body, the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF). In an effort 
to bring the country back into the fold for Rio 2016, World Anti-Doping Agency (Wada) suspended 
an accredited testing lab in Moscow (among others) and created an independent “task force”, aimed 
to overhaul Russia’s anti-doping system. IAAF´s decision on whether to lift the suspension on 
Russian Athletics Federation (RusAF) for the Olympics, set for June 17th, 2016, ruled that Russia 
had not taken sufficient steps to repair its testing procedures. Individual appeals from athletes to 
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (Cas) were eventually denied by the institution, and only those 
who had substantial evidence on avoiding the system were allowed to compete under a neutral flag. 
However, the publication of the so-called McLaren report on July 2016 proved even larger than-
expected doping frauds, showing that the state-sponsored drugs programme infected most sports, 
not only athletics, during the past two Summer Olympics. Thomas Bach, the IOC president, called 
the findings of McLaren’s report “a shocking and unprecedented attack on the integrity of sports 
and on the Olympic Games, (representing) a shocking new dimension in doping with an, until now, 
unimaginable level of criminality”. Urged by far reaching calls from athletes, delegations and anti-
doping officials to bar the entire Russian team, the IOC came under heaver criticism after choosing 
to defer that decision to individual sports federations.  
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Ultimately, 278 participants were allowed to compete under the Russian flag, while other 
108 athletes were barred to compete in Rio. As Wada and Cas were targeted by hackers seeking 
athletes' drug testing data from other nations, President Putin blamed political conspiracy for the 
current situation: “The Games in Rio will be less shiny without Russians” (Folha São Paulo 231). 
The New York Times (157) did not hesitate to judge that the partial ban was “(…) greeted in 
Russia, as is so often the case here these days, with a deep sense of victimhood. But here, the 
decision only added support for a narrative in Russia´s political culture of grievances that revolves 
around perceived slights and anti-Russian conspiracies taking places in the outside world”. Short 
of supporting the standpoint of any party, his accusations were not ungrounded. In point of fact, 
the host country was also accused on doping related issues: The IOC questioned but dig not deeper 
onto Brazil’s decision to stop testing its Olympic team in the build-up to Rio 2016, after the nation’s 
anti-doping agency was ordered to halt its work by Brazil’s sports ministry for most of July.    
In the prospect of banning a whole country that was second in the athletics medal table in 
London, the International Olympic Committee decided differently but damages on reputation were 
inevitable as “IOC’s response to Russia doping scandal (was) nothing more than a confused mess” 
(The Guardian 118). The planning process of the OCOG was deeply affected by the several 
decisions coming from the IOC “(…) because it affected the number of athletes and as such the 
operations of the Olympic Games. Russia was supposed to be the second biggest delegation of the 
Games after the United States. On the other hand, the IOC had no control on the internal doping 
mechanisms of their contractual partner Wada, which clearly failed in his major role in 
guaranteeing a clear sport. In order to not repeat this situation, a contractual revision should be 
held” (Interview). At the end of the day, doping was a factor that determined the legitimacy and 
credibility of several crucial stakeholders within the project environment: Athletes, Delegations, 
Sponsors, Spectators and the project team itself were more or less affected by the removal of past 
and recent medals related to doping scandals. The IOC, on his side, suffered aesthetical damages 








Table 21 - Total number of articles and topic weight across each journal for the event “Doping" 
Doping Articles Topic weight (in %) 
O Globo 45 7 
Folha S. Paulo 93 16 
New York Times 73 38 
The Guardian 102 37 
   (Author´s table) 
 
 
Table 22 - Timing and proportion of publications for the event "Doping" 
Doping O Globo Folha S. Paulo New York Times The Guardian 
November 7 3 0 1 
October 4 1 1 4 
September 0 4 3 7 
August 27 17 23 36 
July 36 40 42 24 
June 16 24 19 14 
May 11 11 11 15 
 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
                           (Author´s table) 
 
 
4.4.5  Environmental commitment 
 
 Key point of Rio´s Olympic bid was a governmental plan to clean up the Guanabara Bay, 
one of the city’s most scenic waterways with more than 50 rivers and streams, through a promised 
80% cut in the flow of sewage pollution. Finally, society saw an opportunity to invert the deplorable 
state of its lagoons, where almost 2 million and 14000 companies deploy their daily waste without 
any sort of treatment. It turned out that one of the events´ biggest legacies had fallen short of its 
goals: Depicted in the Olympic Candidate file as a 4$ billion heavy commitment, the Brazilian 
government eventually spent 170$ million over the past seven years. Only one out of a total of 
eight river treatment units were constructed, while the rest was mainly invested in sewage 
collecting boats and portable barriers that would partially guarantee clear (or good looking) waters 
in competition places. The government shielded wide spreading criticism stating that contracts with 
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sewage treatment companies had to be revised due to clear signs of corruption. However, any 
further development on this issue had to put on hold due to the financial situation of the city.  
Most lately, visitors or athletes became aware after the publication of 16-month-long study 
ordered by the The Associated Press in July 2015. Experts claimed that athletes would compete in 
contaminated waters exposing almost certain dangerous health risks, at levels up to 1.7 million 
times what would be considered highly alarming in the US or Europe. Especially affected was the 
Guanabara Bay with its Rodrigo de Freitas Lagoon, where Olympic rowing took place, and the 
Marina Glória, the starting point for the sailing races. Athletes started to take elaborate precautions 
in a bid to limit contact with the water, but Spanish and Austrian sailing teams were felled by 
gastrointestinal illness and infectious during training sessions. Brazil´s sport minister Picciani 
admitted that the bay as a whole had been only 55% depolluted, while Rio Mayor Eduardo 
acknowledged the failure as lost chance. State Secretary for the Environment, André Correa, 
described the environmental plan as overoptimistic: “20 million reais (6 million dollars) would be 
necessary to execute the municipal plans of sanitation affecting the cities surrounding the bay. 
Money that the state, in crisis, doesn’t have” (Folha São Paulo 295). This did not hinder Olympic 
officials to refuse relocating any of the events. During days of competition, fortunately no 
delegation seriously blamed trash and only one athlete faced sickness to water polluting issues.  
 Newspaper analysis shows that all newspapers did not raise substantial concerns; reporting 
were scarce (Table 23) and mostly written until August (Table 24). This leads to the clear 
conclusion that the clear failure of one of the projects biggest legacies will quickly be forgotten if 
activists’ don´t stand up for it. The Globo (67) newspaper describes it as a “Future of turbid waters”. 
International and local media should have targeted politicians that risked the health of many 
stakeholders just for the show, “but Olympic athletes and international visitors will come and go. 
Remaining will be roughly nine million people who live in the watershed of Guanabara Bay. About 
half of them are not hooked to sanitation systems.” (New York Times 96). 
 With all its possibilities, “the OCOG pressured the government because the alarming news 
about Guanabara´s high levels of pollution lead to several nonappearances from athletes. For a 
spectator, the iconic bay was a success. From a project management perspective, the government 
clearly failed in his technical responsibilities because it won the right to host the Olympics based 
on premise it did not fulfil” (Interview). At the end of the day, this environmental challenge became 
once more a technical failure in the project committed by the Brazilian government. The exposure 
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that such an event would bring apparently was not enough to motivate project managers to really 
tackle this engineering issue. Instead, a temporary solution was adopted through an investment in 
trash collecting boats that did the necessary job to guarantee accepting conditions for competition.   
 
 
Table 23 - Total number of articles and topic weight across each journal for the event “Environment" 
Environment Articles Topic weight (in %) 
O Globo 27 4 
Folha S. Paulo 12 2 
New York Times 7 4 
The Guardian 4 1 
           (Author´s table) 
 
 
Table 24 - Timing and proportion of publications for the event "Environment" 
Environment O Globo Folha S. Paulo New York Times The Guardian 
November 0 0 0 0 
October 7 0 0 0 
September 15 8 0 0 
August 19 8 29 100 
July 26 58 57 0 
June 22 17 14 0 
May 11 8 0 0 
 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
                        (Author´s table) 
 
 
4.4.6  Infrastructure 
 
 For the sake of this analysis, the Infrastructure category included news related to the 
Olympic park, the Olympic Village, other sportive venues and the construction of urban 
infrastructure projects. Apart from a common lack of journalism after the staging of the events 
(Table 25), Infrastructure reporting across the four analysed journals showed distinctive 
configurations: International media had considerable lower topic weights than the other counterpart 
(Table 26), an understandable pattern when taking into consideration that Brazilian newspapers 
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logically had better access to information on the daily advancements of the infrastructural 
undertakings. Even between the local media, it is observable that the headquartered newspaper in 
the hosting city did greater efforts to report on Infrastructure.  
 Approximately one month before the opening ceremony, O Globo (58) informed that “(…) 
between all the challenges ahead of the start of the Olympic Games, the conclusion of venues of 
competition is no more on the bucket list of organizers. In exception to the velodrome (97%) and 
the tennis centre (97%), the Olympic Village of Barra is a practically completed construction, with 
99% execution according to the city government”. Despite the Guardian´s (63) accusations of 
“Olympic organisers (that) have put deadlines ahead of lives, resulting in the deaths of almost a 
dozen construction workers (…)”, the weekly audits from a special team ordered by the interim 
president seemed not to understand that the reality around the construction projects was way 
different. Against all the guarantees depicted before in Globo´s statement, a change of contractor 
about two months away from the start of Games resulted in an unfinished delivery of the 
velodrome. Athletes had to train under heavy construction noises as preparations were conducted 
until the last minute, which did not impede clear signs of an unfinished product during the first 
days of competition. However, prime target of local and international media was the “Athletes´ 
Village, a Nonstop Effort to Stem Flow of Complaints” (New York Times 98). Said to be the 
biggest ever at an Olympics, the complex of 31 buildings welcomed its guests with blocked toilets, 
leaking pipes and exposed wirings. Delegations such as Australia and Argentina refused to move 
in until improvements were made, moving to nearby hotels or apartments. In order to allay 
concerns, an extra 630 member maintenance staff and more than 1,000 cleaners had been engaged 
to fix the problems and clean the village. As if the exposure of all the technical flaws of such a 
crucial infrastructure was not damaging enough for the project, the excuses given by the 
responsible persons to Folha São Paulo (261) were even more blameful. Spokesperson of Rio 2016, 
Carlos Miranda affirmed that “(…) it is natural that fixing have to be made. I am almost placing a 
jumping kangaroo in front of the Australia building so they feel like home.” City Mayor Paes 
followed and affirmed that “The Village is not in the state that Australians are describing. The 
Australians are being the most closed minded country in loving Rio de Janeiro.” Without 
supporting any side, frustration reached levels where delegations such as Germany, Italy, and USA 
even paid for the fixings in their respective buildings to accelerate the process. Also consider that 
only 40% of those buildings were sold as the Games finished. Completely neglected by 
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international media but widely investigated by local media, was the delivery of the Autodrome 
Village to the former habitants of the Olympic Park territory: As a legacy project, the Autodrome 
Village was delivered to the banished low class families with no functioning electrification.  
 Referring to the Olympic Park, the most prominent headline was the light injuring of three 
spectators after a TV camera hit ground. Yet, Brazilian media further reported on the park after the 
Olympic Games finished.  Intended to be managed through a 25 year public-private partnership, 
the government was unable to attract a private investor for both the Park and the iconic Maracanã 
Stadium. Once again, wide-ranging critics questioned the financial viability of such a particular 
megaproject in a country that already inherited several white elephants with the hosting of the 
World Cup in 2014. O Globo (2) critically compared the Olympic project to a finished party 
atmosphere uttering that “during Rio 2016, all the spotlights were set upon the Park in Barra da 
Tijuca. Two months after the competitions, the scenario is of complete abandonment (…), with 
accumulated materials of provisional structures from shops and restaurants that were not collected.  
 This issue evidenced the technical difficulties the government faced with the delivery of the 
Olympic Village, the Velodrome and the Autodrome Village. None of these projects were delivered 
on time and according to the objectives set. The previously described dispute between Olympic 
officials and the Australian team also demonstrated that local planners seemed to have a different 
perception regarding a satisfactory delivery of the project. On top of that, I would even say that 
local planners did not show any perception of quality as the Autodrome Village was delivered with 
no functioning electricity. Take note that the infrastructural undertakings affected a large 
stakeholder environment: Athletes, Delegations, Spectators and the local community suffered with 
this incident. At last, the infrastructure showed to be an economic sublime for the project because 
the government is still struggling to get a financial return from its investment as no private 










Table 25 - Timing and proportion of publications for the event "Infrastructure" 
Infrastructure O Globo Folha S. Paulo New York Times The Guardian 
November 6 2 0 5 
October 1 6 0 15 
September 9 5 0 5 
August 37 25 73 50 
July 31 36 20 20 
June 7 16 7 0 
May 9 9 0 5 
 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
                  (Author´s table) 
 
 
Table 26 - Total number of articles and topic weight across each journal for the event “Infrastructure" 
Infrastructure Articles Topic weight (in %) 
O Globo 141 22 
Folha S. Paulo 85 15 
New York Times 15 8 
The Guardian 20 7 
                     (Author´s table) 
 
 
4.4.7  Mobility  
 
 The Mobility category included all articles associated to transportation projects, namely 
the Metro Line 4 extension, the Bus Rapid Transit corridor extensions and the Light Rail Vehicle 
construction. Also collected were news of mobility operations established during the Games.  
 Every Olympiad arises logistical challenges for a city and its planners. London 2012 
showed to be no different, with long traffic jams and congestions affecting the whole population 
during days of competition. While this problematic issue is hardly avoidable, remember that the 
logistics and mobility procedures for Rio 2016 officials and athletes were a task of the OCOG. 
Unfortunately, the local project team seemed incapable of meeting their clients’ expectations as 
“(…) there (had) not been enough cars at the ready, and many drivers assigned to ferry officials 
around (did) not know the way to various venues” (New York Times 43). Those critics clearly 
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highlighted the technical failure (and sublime) of local planners to forecast athletes and officials 
demand for dedicated transportation.  
  However, the aforementioned complaints were a much smaller problem for the OCOG 
when compared to the governmental responsibilities in the area of transportation. All those 
commitments were, to a greater or lesser extent, delivered with delays. The most prominent and 
referred examples were the extension of the metro line: A megaproject with the risk of not being 
delivered on time for the Games. Key legacy of Rio de Janeiro´s Olympics, the metro line 4 
eventually opened four days ahead of the opening ceremony, and only due an extra funding 
sponsored by the interim president. Besides wide spreading critics on the fact that this inaugural 
was temporarily limited for Olympic visitors only (project planners applied the same decision on 
the BRT), investigations were laid upon the dubious selection of construction partners that played 
into the “(…) approximately costs of 9,7 bn reais. This value represents almost the double of the 
initially estimated 5bn reais in the initial plans” (O Globo 213).  
 Hence, this particular megaproject showed what was already mentioned before in the 
literature review: Beyond being two years after schedule, this project was also facing 
considerable cost overruns which up to the date of the publishing were not clearly revealed. At 
the end, the Mobility category highlighted the technical failure from governmental planners as 
well as from the OCOG to execute their tasks regarding this matter.  
 Up until the competition on August (Table 27), articles were mainly based on the current 
state of the transportation systems. Then they shifted towards OCOG´s technical failures. Note 
the only Globo paid substantial efforts to report on this issue (Table 28), a logical behaviour for a 
headquartered newspaper in the hosting city. After all, Globo focussed on fundamental issues for 











Table 27 - Timing and proportion of publications for the event "Mobility" 
Mobility O Globo Folha S. Paulo New York Times The Guardian 
November 3 0 0 0 
October 3 7 0 0 
September 16 7 0 0 
August 29 29 100 67 
July 24 18 0 0 
June 15 32 0 0 
May 10 7 0 33 
 100 100 100 100 
                        (Author´s table) 
 
 
Table 28 - Total number of articles and topic weight across each journal for the event “Mobility" 
Mobility Articles Topic weight (in %) 
O Globo 116 18 
Folha S. Paulo 28 5 
New York Times 2 1 
The Guardian 3 1 




4.4.8  Ticket sale fraud – Pat Hickey  
 
The 71 year old Irish Olympic executive Pat Hickey had been accused for fraudulent ticket 
sales. More explicitly, he operated a ring with the Dublin-based Pro10 Sports Management in order 
to funnel overpriced tickets intended for use by the Irish committee, and not authorised for resale, 
to the international sports hospitality company THG Sports. According to the New York Times 
(40), the arrest “(…) took place just before 8 a.m. at an oceanfront hotel where top Olympic 
officials are staying. In an action evoking the early-morning arrests of soccer officials in 
Switzerland last year, Mr. Hickey was taken by surprise as he answered the door to his hotel room 
unclothed, later emerging in a white bathrobe”. 
66 
 
As one of the International Olympic Committee’s most senior figures for the last two 
decades, head of the Olympic Committee of Ireland since 1989 and also head of the European 
Olympic Committees, Pat Hickey´s arrest to a maximum security prison in Rio de Janeiro became 
a highly political sublime for the IOC and the government. The IOC, head team of the project, saw 
no other option than to immediately suspend “on a temporary basis” Hickey´s role after heavy 
accusations of alleged ticket-touting, conspiracy and ambush marketing. Furthermore, three 
members of the Olympic Council of Ireland (OCI) were suspects of being involved in the illegal 
sales, but eventually got their passports returned after those were seized for a week. While all those 
accusations overshadowed Ireland’s participation in the Rio games, the release of Mr. Hickey two 
weeks after the arrest did not lessen pressures on the IOC. The particular role of Mr. Bach was 
questioned by local authorities as Ireland´s extra seat allotment was granted after the identification 
of an e-mail exchange between him and Hickey. In times of unveiling the truth behind management 
practices from organizations such as the FIFA or the IOC, such allegations unwillingly harm the 
image and the aesthetical sublime of the project and put the respective teams under an unwanted 
spotlight. Supporting the view of New York Times, The Guardian (63) perfectly shows how 
quickly a distinct project team can be associated to the corruptive practices of another organization: 
“Pat Hickey allegations remind world that IOC is as out-of-date as FIFA. The sporting spectacle 
of the Rio Olympics has not managed to obscure the myriad scandals of corruption, doping and 
corporate glutton.” Whether the accusations directed to the IOC are true or not, a negative and 
mistrustful signal is sent to the whole stakeholder environment: Contractors, sponsors, suppliers, 
clients and other partners start to question the project owner´s honesty.  
Brazilian authorities still have ongoing police investigations, but the local newspapers  went 
even further to compliment “the Irish government (that) initiated an independent investigation 
regarding the illegal ticket reselling, expanding the inquiry to the Games of London 2012 and Sochi 
2014” (Folha São Paulo 72). Mr. Hickey’s passport was retained for four further months, until the 
Association of Olympic Committees (ANOC), of which Hickey was vice president, agreed to 
temporarily loan a 410.000€ bail payment for him to return home for medical reasons. For the local 
project team, this particular incident was regarded as positive because “(…) it boosted the 
confidence regarding the investigative capacity of local authorities to deal with complex and 
globally exposed frauds” (Interview).  
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In contrast to the 1% weight of this topic to the other three journals, the Pat Hickey incident 
seized 5% of project related reporting from the Guardian (Table 29). One possible explanation for 
this observation is the British origin of the aforementioned newspaper, which eventually has higher 
interest to investigate a sensitive topic involving an Irish citizen.  
 
 
Table 29 - Total number of articles and topic weight across each journal for the event “Pat Hickey" 
Pat Hickey Articles Topic weight (in %) 
O Globo 5 1 
Folha S. Paulo 7 1 
New York Times 2 1 
The Guardian 13 5 
               (Author´s table) 
 
 
4.4.9  Ryan Lochte  
 
Shortly after the last Olympic swimming Games took place, American swimmer Ryan 
Lochte and his teammates announced to be victims of a gunpoint robbery while returning to the 
athletes’ village from a party. The culprit was supposedly a Brazilian police officer. However, local 
authorities presented video evidence contradicting Ryan Lochte, who hid the truth about what 
ended up being a drunken incident of vandalism at a gas station by him and his colleagues. 
 After Pat Hickey´s arrest, the Ryan Lochte story was another incident that created a buzz 
in the media about a member of the Olympic community. Notwithstanding the fact that this was 
only a hot topic during the month of August (Table 30), there is a differentiating observation 
between local and international media: Brazilian newspapers did not meet, as maybe predicted, the 
expected level of reporting regarding this incident, whereas The Guardian and the New York Times 
seemed to be more sensitive to the issue by registering respective topic weights of 7% and 7% 
(Table 31). According to the British newspaper (61), “Ryan Lochte, swimmer, reality TV star – 
and now diplomatic incident (…) always had a knack for catching headlines but after his tale of 
robbery in Rio was rumbled they have been far from flattering”.  
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 The Ryan Lochte case turned out to be a highly delicate and political topic between the 
Brazilian government and the highest represented nation of the Olympic Games, Team USA. After 
all, the New York Times (32) predicted “(…) a dispute that quickly transcended sports, emerging 
as a point of tension between the United States and Brazil as the authorities in Rio de Janeiro faced 
scrutiny over their security preparations for the Olympics in a city on edge over a crime wave and 
gun battles between drug gangs and the police”. The aforementioned statement correctly expanded 
the perspective on the project environment, unveiling the unneglectable aesthetic damage the city 
suffered from this incident. Remember that in light of the ever existing violence in the host city, 
the projects´ viability was largely questioned by the media long before the event took place. The 
Brazilian government embraced those concerns and undertook the biggest mobilization of security 
personnel ever. Suddenly, the initial claims of the alleged victims overshadowed those efforts: In 
any case, Ryan Lochte´s version reported of a gunpoint robbery undertaken by a police officer. 
This episode unleashed a discussion around Brazil, where many Brazilians themselves often lament 
their exposure to alarming levels of violent crime and police corruption.  
Plausibly, local reactions were strong as local investigation led to the incontestable evidence 
that one of the most-decorated swimmers in American history, with 12 overall medals over four 
Olympics, was making up a story: “We saw our city stained by a fantastical version,” said Fernando 
Veloso, the Civil Police chief for the state of Rio de Janeiro. While Lochte left the country shortly 
before a judge ordered the confiscation of his passport, two other swimmers in the 'robbery' case 
were taken off from a flight at Rio airport. Later on, Rio´s Mayor accepted the statement of The 
United States Olympic Committee (USOC), who publicly expressed regret about the incident: “On 
behalf of the United States Olympic Committee, we apologize to our hosts in Rio and the people 
of Brazil for this distracting ordeal in the midst of what should rightly be a celebration of 
excellence” (O Globo 152). Lochte has been charged by filing false robbery report that carries a 
maximum penalty of up to 18 months in prison, tried in absentia if he doesn’t show up in Brazil. 
In addition, he lost four of his major sponsors, got banned from swimming for 10 months and will 
forfeit $100,000. Lochte´s team-mates were given four-month suspension.  
 Both the ticket sale fraud as well as the Ryan Lochte incident demonstrated how suddenly 
a project can turn into a serious political or diplomatic incident, caused by fraudulent or 
inappropriate actions of one person inserted in the project environment. In this particular incident, 
it was hardly expected that a vandalized restroom at the gas station and the subsequent 
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confrontation between the athletes and the security guards would create such a thrill in newspapers 
and in the local community. In viewpoint of the interviewed person, the OCOG appraised the 
professional and disciplined approach from the local authorities: “Thankfully for the public image 
of the project, our police authorities did a prestigious job by being able to review surveillance 
videos and witness testimonies.” As a conclusion, this particular event became a political and 
aesthetical sublime for the government, characterized by a professional and sensitive work 
conducted by local Brazilian authorities to restore the harming image the victims laid upon the city 
after their allegations.    
 
 
Table 30 - Timing and proportion of publications for the event "Ryan Lochte" 
Ryan Lochte O Globo Folha S. Paulo New York Times The Guardian 
November 0 0 0 0 
October 0 0 0 0 
September 13 0 7 10 
August 88 100 93 90 
July 0 0 0 0 
June 0 0 0 0 
May 0 0 0 0 
 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
                      (Author´s table) 
 
 
Table 31 - Total number of articles and topic weight across each journal for the event “Ryan Lochte" 
Ryan Lochte Articles Topic weight (in %) 
O Globo 8 1 
Folha S. Paulo 13 2 
New York Times 14 7 
The Guardian 20 7 









4.4.10  Security  
 
 Budget cuts, growing unemployment rates and a deep folded recession led to an uptick in 
2016 Rio de Janeiro´s crime scene, an aspect that project officials seriously concerned when this 
city emitted its Olympic Candidate File in 2009. Largely covered by local media until the closing 
ceremony of the Olympic Games (Table 32), almost one out of five articles in Globo or Folha São 
Paulo were related to this topic (Table 33). On the other hand, international media clearly shifted 
its interest to other events.  
 This does not mean that international readers or upcoming visitors were not informed about 
the host city´s problems. Weeks before the Olympic Games, Rio 2016 delegations felt violence up 
close as was the case (among others) of an Australian Paralympic champion who got robbed at 
gunpoint while training in the host city months before the opening ceremony. Moreover, parts of a 
mutilated body have washed up on the sands of Copacabana, meters away from the Volleyball 
venues. Delegations called on Brazilian authorities to deploy extra security ahead of the Rio de 
Janeiro games, a request that could be fulfilled only after the 895m$ emergency loan from Michel 
Temer to guarantee local safety operations. Interventions also included the arrestment of several 
suspects of terrorism, a growing concern as France suffered several attacks in July 2016.   In light 
of that, the interim president personally reinforced his intentions greeting upcoming visitors in a 
video publication “(…) as part of an effort to minimize the problems of the city, 27 days ahead of 
the Olympics” (O Globo 443). Until then, “(…) helicopters have been grounded and more than half 
of the civil police’s fleet of cars has been idled in a bid to save on gas. Even officers’ salaries have 
been delayed. Rio de Janeiro’s security forces (were) so pressed for funds that some (had) to beg 
for donations of pens, cleaning supplies and even toilet paper, fuelling worries about safety at the 
world’s premier sporting event” (The Guardian 198).  
 At the end of the day, an approximately 85000 strong police and military force was 
deployed, twice the amount when compared to the former event in London. Notwithstanding the 
occurrence of several incidents during the days of competition (Table 34), no athlete or visitor 
suffered major harm. Safety concerns became also a responsibility for the OCOG, as they were 
responsible for security staff inside the venues. However, the local team “(…) suffered with the 
lack of private security and as such, the government helped with additional public forces inside the 
places of competition” (Interview). Of unique responsibility for the Brazilian government, the 
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security deployment became a highly political, economic and aesthetical sublime in the Olympic 
project. Faced by the internal pressures from the media, the government saw no other option than 
to perform big unexpected investments in order to mitigate concerns before the start of the Games. 
Critics that ultimately damaged the image of the project even before the opening ceremony.  
 
Table 32 - Timing and proportion of publications for the event "Security" 
Security O Globo Folha S. Paulo New York Times The Guardian 
November 1 0 0 0 
October 4 2 0 0 
September 8 2 0 0 
August 30 22 69 56 
July 41 58 23 11 
June 12 10 8 28 
May 4 6 0 6 
 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
                           (Author´s table) 
 
 
Table 33 - Total number of articles and topic weight across each journal for the event “Security" 
Security Articles Topic weight (in %) 
O Globo 121 19 
Folha S. Paulo 99 17 
New York Times 13 7 
The Guardian 18 6 
            (Author´s table) 
 
 
Table 34 - Security incidents during the Olympic Games 
                                 (Author´s table) 
  
Security incidents during the Olympic Games 
Minor thefts on athletes, despite being ordered to follow a number of strict safety protocols. 
Two stray bullet were fired into media tent at equestrian venue. 
Police killings of favela residents as one officer got shot by local habitants. 
Attack on an Olympic media bus on highway, in which three journalists suffered minor cuts. 
Thefts in the Olympic Village. 
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4.4.11  Ticket Sales performance 
 
 Of unique responsibility to the Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games (OCOG), the 
ticket sales performance of the Olympic Games remained an unknown variable for the press. One 
week prior to the opening ceremony, local newspaper Folha de São Paulo (203) reported that 
demand was only four points away from the established sales target of 84%. A goal that was of 
extreme importance because it was “(…) part of the estimated revenues to close the balance sheets 
from the organizing team, which predicted that 16% of pending bills are paid through the ticket 
selling.” Taking into account a publication from Globo (573) in late May, it can be concluded that 
the local project team was able to boost sales by 23% under the last two month prior to the start of 
the event.  
However, international media doubted on the reliability of those numbers. The New York 
Times (109) pronounced that “(…) after one week of competition and some of the smallest crowds 
in the modern history of Olympic track and field, it seems fair to think the sport could have done 
better (selling a bunch of tickets when Usain Bolt runs does not count).” Venues were marked by 
empty seats, and excuses rapidly followed by the local press. Among the motives raised by analysts 
were the distance and difficulty of transportation to some competition venues, the lack of interest 
from Brazilians to some less popular and traditional sports in the country, the cost of the tickets, 
the entry fee paid to the sponsors, the distribution of tickets to public school students and the 
negative news that could have drowned the interest from foreigners. As one of the most critic 
journals on that present matter (Table 35), the Guardians kept an unimpressed attitude towards all 
those reasons and even accused the distribution of 240000 tickets to public school students as a 
desperate attempt to fill the Olympic venues in less popular sports such as golf, rugby sevens and 
hockey (even particular soccer matches were marked by half-occupied stadiums). Although never 
questioning the social nature of the act itself, denunciations were targeted towards the OCOG. The 
local project team grounded its decision to hand out the tickets under the apparent satisfactory sales 
performance that was hardly ever observable. This aggressive positioning from the Guardian 
towards the projects selling performance lead to several direct references from local newspapers, 
which seemed to be anxious on the repercussions that such suspicions may lay on the public image 
of the project. O Globo even came to highlight the article of the British journal called “The athletics 
elite turns op on time but Rio seems still to be in bed”.  
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Towards the lasting and irrepressible memory that the unoccupied venues, fears for Rio´s 
Paralympics were not smaller. One month prior to the play out, president of International 
Paralympic Committee Sir Philip Craven classified the situation as precarious. Despite prices as 
low as 10 reais – a quarter of the cheapest seat prices at the Olympics, organisers revealed that only 
12% of the tickets have been sold and that the event had to be downsized amid the most challenging 
circumstances faced in its 56-year history. Parties have been cancelled, big screens taken down and 
1,900 temporary staff laid off. The number of seats has also been reduced from 3.4 million to 2.5 
million units. In addition to that which has already been described, the responsible project actors 
failed to pay grants of up to $8m to allow smaller countries to travel to the Games. The IPC saw 
no other solution than to accept $46.5m in public money, a highly political debate considering the 
nations suffering from the worst recession in decades. Isolating the project from the political tone, 
Rio 2016 turned out to the second-most attended Paralympic Games in history with total sales up 
to 1.8m, surpassing Beijing in 2008 with 1.7m tickets sold. 
Referring to the interview, ticket sales was one of the biggest concerns for the OCOG 
because it represented one of their main source of revenue. As such, this event became a major 
economical factor for the local project team. Furthermore, the empty venues also put the local 
project in a bad spotlight because provided statements before the Games seemed not to prove the 
reality throughout the days of competition. The local team projected its internal forecasts on the 
assumption that 90% of total sales were going to Brazilian spectators. With that in mind, the late 
peak of sales could be explained “(…) by a combination of the negative influence from the 
international media and the Brazilian cultural habit of delaying expenses”. Notwithstanding the 
OCOG´s satisfaction with its concerted publicity to boost sales, they now face the challenge of 
retrieving failed compensations to fans. This process is undertaken manually because the local 
project team lost access to the sales database as soon as the contract expired with the responsible 









Table 35 - Total number of articles and topic weight across each journal for the event “Ticket Sales" 
Ticket Sales Articles Topic weight (in %) 
O Globo 30 5 
Folha S. Paulo 37 6 
New York Times 3 2 
The Guardian 28 10 
     (Author´s table) 
 
 
4.4.12  Zika 
 
Brazil remains the country most-affected by Zika, a mosquito-borne virus proven to cause 
a severe birth defect that results in babies born with abnormally small heads and underdeveloped 
brains. In rare cases, it leads to paralyses or death. As a result, in February 2016 the World Health 
Organization (WHO) declared Zika as a public health emergency of international concern 
(PHEIC). Fears were grounded on the potential global spread of the virus by the influx of Olympic 
visitors to the Brazilian city. Travel restrictions on Zika-affected countries were not issued, but 
expectant mothers had been advised not to travel to avoid the Olympic Games.  
Despite the fact that this virus-infected mosquito was already discovered in the late 40s´ in 
Uganda, W.H.O´s recent proclamation to Zika deeply affected the projects´ image. All of a sudden, 
the marvellous city of Rio de Janeiro was reported as an epicentre for this particular virus-infected 
mosquito. Rio 2016 organisers were judged after rejecting calls from 150 of the world’s leading 
scientists to reschedule the Olympics. According to The New York Times (171), this decision “(…) 
highlighted the long collaboration between the W.H.O and the International Olympic Committee, 
(…) an overly close relationship that left the health agency to be impartial in Olympic matters.”  
With six months left for the hosting city to welcome visitors from the whole world, the 
timing of the Zika threat couldn’t be more inadequate for the project. Unmistakeably reflected by 
the topic weight of the issue, the international media put more emphasis on this particular topic 
than its local reporting counterpart (Table 36). This observation can be explained by the fact that 
the local community was ever since subjacent to this mosquito, and as result the Zika virus “(…) 
resulted in a precipitated, prejudiced and unfair portrayal undertaken by the international media” 
(Interview).  The Guardian as well as the New York Times enjoyed renewed interest on this 
particular topic since readership came mostly from North-American or western countries. Distant 
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from the actual reality of Rio de Janeiro, expected visitors feared about the potential disease that 
up do this date has no functional or scientifically proven cure to eliminate the virus. 
Costly manoeuvres were necessary to protect the project from further international 
scepticism, with the Brazilian government performing the biggest military mobilisation in the 
nation´s history: 220,000 army, navy and air force personnel as well as 315,000 public officials 
have been called to actively combat the mosquito and to further educate its society. Folha de São 
Paulo (447) highlighted this action and cited their health minister, who “(…) alleged that the efforts 
to control Aedes Aegypti helped to reduce in 90% the number of accused infections of Zika in Rio 
and further reinforced that, historically speaking, mosquito based diseases is low during August, 
when the Olympic Games take place.” The interview further revealed that the IOC, in his major 
consultant role, applied huge pressure on the OCOG. The result was the implementation a special 
team and a phone line in order to deal with all possible question marks around this particular issue. 
Moreover, the local project team and the government saw itself force to invest heavily in marketing 
campaigns with the purpose of reducing the negative impressions created by the media. In the face 
of all those efforts, the Olympic project, holder of one of the most valuable brands of the world, 
still seemed unable to attract the best international athletes for the largest sportive event in the 
world. Prominent tennis and golf athletes, such as Rory McIlroy, refused to attend Rio 2016 due to 
fears of contamination. The Guardian (186) spotlighted this choice, stating that “(…) Ilroy 
delivered the most withering criticism of golf’s inclusion in the Olympics, suggesting the sport was 
irrelevant in the context of the Games and also admitting he was “not sure” whether he would even 
be watching it”. After a 112 year absence from the Olympic Games, this obviously led to severe 
repercussions for the International Golf Federation (IGF) and its reborn modality.  
Conclusively, the Zika threat deeply affected both the government as well as the local 
project team in aesthetical and economic terms. Surprised about the virus´ unexpected yet global 
impact on athletes and the tourism industry, projections on the number of tourist arrivals and on 
athletes’ attendance became increasingly difficult as the Games approached and Zika news 
intensified. As soon as the Games started however, this threat on the project dissipated because 
across all different journals, Zika was only a raised issue up until the month of August (Table 37). 
Therefore, a positive but unpraised light shines upon the project actors that confirmed the 
predictions from the newly elected sports minister expecting close to zero cases of Zika during the 
Olympics, later confirmed by the WHO in September 2016. 
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Table 36 - Total number of articles and topic weight across each journal for the event “Zika" 
Zika Articles Topic weight (in %) 
O Globo 21 3 
Folha S. Paulo 36 6 
New York Times 30 16 
The Guardian 34 12 




Table 37 - Timing and proportion of publications for the event "Zika" 
Zika O Globo Folha S. Paulo New York Times The Guardian 
November 0 0 0 0 
October 0 0 0 0 
September 5 3 3 0 
August 14 3 10 3 
July 29 25 37 24 
June 33 42 33 29 
May 19 28 17 44 
 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 












5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
 In order to analyse the principal events occurred during the realization of the Olympic 
Games in light of megaproject theory, it should be first understood which Project Management 
constructs can better assess the main conceptual undertakings. 
 The Olympic Games are beyond any doubt a megaproject. To no surprise, key 
characteristics such as large commitments involving massive sums of investment and a numerous 
surrounding stakeholder environment were also clearly present in this project. Still, Olympics 
deserve a special attention that up to this date does simply not exist or can be at best evaluated as 
insufficient. While the modern academic focus of literature lies on the conceptualization and 
explanation of the inherent growth of complexity and uncertainty in even bigger becoming 
construction projects, the largest stage of sport is widely neglected. Remember that also this 
particular type of megaproject is increasing: Compared to the Olympic Games of Antiquity, the 
Modern Games are secular, hosted every two years in another country, of larger duration and open 
to all athletes of the globe. Nowadays, winter editions are only smaller to the Summer Games when 
referred to the number of athletes. Other than that, the never experienced investments in both winter 
and summer editions mean that every two years in some corner of the world, a new sportive 
megaproject is erected. As a matter of fact, Sochi 2014 demonstrated that various unexpected 
factors caused the budget to expand from an estimated US$12 billion to actual US$51 billion, 
making Sochi the most expensive Olympics in history. With the absence of an acknowledgeable 
paper on this particular event, I can only assume that project actors were once more overrun by the 
complexity and uncertainty surrounding such a megaproject. Like Rio 2016, projects that require 
a close decade long connexion, coordination and planning of three main actors: The International 
Olympic Committee, the Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games and the Government. Like 
Rio 2016, projects of worldwide exposure where management is meticulously over watched by 
record breaking activities from international and local media: A stakeholder which that does not 
always stay to a truthful reporting style, misrepresenting main responsibilities around the project 
and closing still ongoing issues. For that reason, an interview was conducted in order to clearly 
understand the responsibility matrix around Rio 2016.   
 Here, I even dare to admit that the Olympic Games are more complex than any 
infrastructural project in the future. No matter how expensive and how technical those 
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constructions will be, they will never reach the dynamics and density of an Olympic project. My 
statement is grounded on one simple, yet up to this date unreported, fact. The Olympic Games as 
a megaproject are more than a colossal construction project. Of course, billion worth new venues 
in the Olympic Park, transportation systems around the whole city and Olympic Village buildings 
in Barra de Tijuca were built. Otherwise the event would not take place anyways. But the scope 
and the challenge to deliver a final valuable product to the society and its environment is far 
superior to any traditional and infrastructural megaproject. But what is value or success of an 
Olympic project? A record setting show from athletes? An unforgettable party between the local 
community and visitors? Is it the delivery of infrastructures on budget and on time?  
 Adopting a management perspective but without any clear adopted definition from 
literature, I would say that a successful hosting of the world stage of sport is synonym to a clear 
understanding and professional handling of all the topics raised throughout all the stages in the 
project environment. While this definition could be translated to a traditional megaproject, we 
could perfectly agree that topics raised in Rio de Janeiro were far more diverse. As showed during 
data analysis, stakeholders were numerous, varied and applied pressures that were directed to one 
or more project actors at the same time. During the preparatory phases of Rio 2016, hardly anyone 
predicted that the biggest threat in the stakeholder environment would come from a mosquito, 
which became even more powerful after respected medics requested the cancelation of the event. 
This threat in combination with the delicate political and financial and situation of the country 
forced the government and local project managers to reach beyond their boundaries (and pockets), 
who tried to avoid by all measures the negative aesthetical images laid upon the hosting city. The 
violent state of the city turned to reach even higher political dimensions after Ryan Lochte´s 
incident alleging a gunpoint robbery by a police offer. At the same time crucial infrastructures and 
transportation systems, such as the Olympic Village and the Metro, turned to be a technical 
headache for the Brazilian government until the early beginnings of the Games. The IOC was also 
forced to political encounters ahead and after of the opening ceremony, which tried to keep an 
honourable aesthetic position in times of unveiling the truth of dubious management practices: The 
Doping scandal, the Pat Hickey case as well as the Tokyo bid audit were issues that deeply 
questioned the integrity and honesty of the IOC within the stakeholder environment. On the other 
hand, the closing ceremony does not mean that the project is completed. At present times, the 
OCOG is negotiating with past contractors and suppliers as their main source of revenues, ticket 
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sales, was apparently low. The environmental legacy of the project, as of the big promises of the 
Olympic project, is unfortunately worthless to mention because the Brazilian Government once 
more decided not to pay attention to this long lasting problem of the Guanabara Bay.  
 
Figure 4 - Project related events in the overall context of Rio 2016 
 
                  (Author´s figure) 
  
 As illustrated in Figure 4, most project related issues were targeted towards the 
Government. Events such as the crisis and the Zika threat directly impacted the OCOG and the 
Government, while other were clearly targeted towards one project actor. A closer look on this 
portrayal also shows that the surrounding stakeholder environment around each of these events 
would be enormous, leading to a huge stakeholder map depicting only 7 months of the project. This 
line of thought goes in hand with the inherent complexity of megaprojects. Relationships are not 
only diverse through the lifetime of a megaproject, but new interactions may also come up as such 
unpredictable events emerge. Events that enhance the risk of the project as a whole. We also 
observed that such interactions can have different impacts on the project actors, who sometimes 
even seem to be overwhelmed by the complexity of the entire system: The Doping case was clearly 
an issue that the IOC was nothing more than a confused mess, lacking managerial decision making. 
Under sever time pressure, all sport federations were obliged to decide individually on each 
Russian athlete if he would be allowed to compete or not.   
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 At the end of the day, a portrayal of Rio 2016 Olympic Games´ main project related issues 
was only possible by adapting Flyvberg´s four sublimes of traditional (infrastructural) 
megaprojects to each main project actor (Table 38). In this version, the dimensions are more related 
to the Olympic project as a whole, to whatever it constitutes under the lacking academic literature. 
Stakeholder theory or Institutional theory would never be able to classify the project in this 
apparently simple manner, because an Olympic project can be regarded as an aggregation of a lot 
smaller projects that those theories fail to explain. Those theories do indeed look at one project but 
as mentioned before, the Olympic project is more than that. The Metro extension, the Olympic 
Village construction, the security deployment, the ticket sales performance can all be considered 
an individual project. They all have a start and a due date, with clear and distinctive objectives.  
  This simple picture below can be regarded as pioneering in the areas of Olympic Games 
because nobody strictly investigated what was really said and reported on the project. Some general 
assumptions about pressures and priorities from international and local media were refuted. Still, 
this table is only a portrait, a static description of a huge project under a specific seven month time 
frame. Further description on how each of these issues, or were solved is only possible a strict 
application of the two aforesaid theories to each event.   
 
Table 38 - Project – related events and their political, aesthetical, economic and technological impacts on the 
main project actors 
 IOC OCOG Government 
Political 
(1) Bidding Countries 
(4) Doping 





(8) Pat Hickey 
(9) Ryan Lochte 
Aesthetic 
(1) Bidding Countries 
(4) Doping 
(8) Pat Hickey 
(2) Boxing scandal 
(11) Ticket Sales 
(2) Boxing scandal 
(5) Environment 




















6.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 As already stressed out, my personal desire is to expedite an academic focus dedicated to 
this type of megaproject. Up to this day, there is no consensus on the definition of an Olympic 
Games project and what its factors and criteria of success are. With that in mind, a first yet crucial 
step would encompass a qualitative research on the different perspectives across several 
stakeholder groups inserted in this project environment. Only then a commonly accepted definition 
of an Olympic project can be put for further discussion. 
 To continue the stream of stakeholder management in this sportive event, an appraisable 
approach in literature would encompass the comprehensive mapping of a stakeholder environment 
consisting of multiple actors, both public and private, with conflicting interests (Aaltonen & Kujala, 
2010). Classification methodologies could follow Mitchell et al.'s (1997) notable stakeholder 
salience model, developed to characterize and classify stakeholders by considering three 
stakeholder attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency. Surpassing researcher´s difficulty of 
obtaining information in regard to stakeholders' attributes, behaviours and interactions, a final 
approach on SM would englobe an extensive study on the mutual adjustments made by the actors 
placed in the Olympic Games environment (Morris, 2013). More specifically on their strategic 
response shaping mechanisms (PMI, 2013). 
 In light of behavioural studies, institutional theory could be another perfectly matching 
theory for the Olympic Games. Applied to the three main actors, it would be interesting to 
investigate Scott´s (2012) behavioural process of social structures among the three pillars (Scott, 
2004): regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive elements. The fact that institutional theory 
recognizes institutions not only as social structures, but also as concrete independent organizations 
whose operations are not purely profit-driven (Phillips, Lawrence & Hardy, 2000) only comes in 
handy. After all, we are talking here about a public private partnership project in which the 
Government may be influencing project performance with the adoption of strict governance 
frameworks (Christensen, 2011; Crawford & Helm, 2009; Klakegg, Williams & Magnussen, 2009; 
Williams, Klagegg, Magnussen & Glasspool, 2010). In addition to the fact he may have different 
objectives to the IOC, the Government as a risk averse entity is expected to have another view and 
management style when compared to the other project actors. At the end, all of them are trying to 
cope with the intrinsic complexity of the Olympic Games.  
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 Furthermore, the Olympic Games of Rio de Janeiro showed several signs of corruption, an 
under-researched topic in the project management literature according to Locatelli, Mariani, Sainati 
& Greco (2016). Those authors state that megaprojects context have most of the features favouring 
corruptions as they present a large project size, uniqueness and complexity. Rio 2016 can be put as 
a case study when taking into consideration the doping scandal, the Pat Hickey arrest and the Tokyo 
bid. Those were only briefly described in this paper.      
  Also, the role of politics in Olympics is up until now not studied. Just remember that the 
largest stage of sport can be seen also seen as a stage of local and international protest. Looking 
only to the articles from the New York Times, I could figure out five events of public protest: The 
protest of an Ethiopian runner, the undressing from Mongolian wrestling coaches, the stoning of 
the torch relay, the win of a female Kenyan marathon athlete after dodging a protester near the 
finish line and the expulsions of protesters at Rio Olympic venues. 
 I would also recommend other project management authors to take special attention when 
doing a documentary analysis of such a megaproject, as information was often misleading or 
simply not truthful. During Rio 2016, Rrgular press meetings were held with the media in order to 
inform about the project´s responsibility matrix. The OCOG further expanded their efforts by 
creating an online news platform, where journalists could access massive amounts of true 
information related to the project. However the media did not appraise those efforts as it should, 
ignoring the purpose of those rounds and continuing to address and link issues to the wrong 
identities. Infrastructure problems were reported as responsibility of the OCOG, but that was an 
issue of unique accountability to the government. The most prominent example was the 
problematic release of the Olympic Village, which got under heavy criticism from several 
delegations claiming that conditions were unsatisfactory. Despite being the responsibility of the 
government, the OCOG was targeted by the media on that particular issue. In fact, it was the 
government who acquired the territory with the promise to deliver high standard infrastructure. The 
OCOG was merely a temporary renting client that suffered the consequences of receiving a 
building in inadequate terms to satisfy their main stakeholders, the athletes. After the Games, the 
contract seized and the sales of the apartments become a task of the government. Another example 
was the Zika threat that rapidly disappeared as a hot topic as soon as the Games began. Foreign 
right holders of imagery, who were already present in the city before the event, saw the Zika virus 
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as an opportunity to report negatively on the Olympic Games. Athletes and tourists raised 
substantial concerns whether or not to attend the event. 
 The final recommendation and probably the most difficult to follow would consist in the 
elaboration of a framework in order to make a comparative analysis between the different editions 
of the Olympic Games. Perfectly aware of the fact that each project environment is unique, some 
variables in the project could be more comparative than others, such as project team size. As such, 
not only the Olympic project per se, but also the individual study of each Olympiad should be 
investigated in literature so that future project managers can could trace conclusions between 
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